ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ БЮДЖЕТНОЕ ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ ИНКЛЮЗИВНОГО ВЫСШЕГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ
**«МОСКОВСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ ГУМАНИТАРНО- ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ»**

КАФЕДРА РОМАНО-ГЕРМАНСКИХ ЯЗЫКОВ

«Утверждаю»

Зав. кафедры романо-германских языков

С. Казиахмедова

«___»_____2020г.

# ФОНД ОЦЕНОЧНЫХ СРЕДСТВ
# ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ

НАУЧНО-ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКАЯ РАБОТА Б2.В.02(Н)
наименование дисциплины / практики

45.04.02      Лингвистика_____
шифр и наименование направления подготовки

Перевод и переводоведение
наименование программы подготовки

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Фонд оценочных средств рассмотрен и одобрен на заседании кафедры романо-германских языков, протокол № 1 от «28» августа 2020 г.

# Содержание

# 1. Паспорт фонда оценочных средств

по практике <u>Научно исследовательская работа Б2.В.02 (Н)</u>

Таблица 1.

**2 курс 4 семестр**

| № п/п | Контролируемые разделы (этапы) НИР | Коды компе тенций | Оценочные средства - наименование | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | текущий контроль | промежуточн ая аттестация |
| 1. | Подготовительный | ОК-8 ОК-9 | Индивидуальн ый опрос | |
| 2. | Обзор и анализ информации по теме ВКР. | ОПК-7 ОПК-31 | Индивидуальн ый опрос | |
| 3 | Завершающий | ОК-8 ОК-9 | Индивидуальн ый опрос | Индивидуаль ный опрос |

Таблица 2.   Перечень компетенций:

| Код компетенц ии | Наименование результата обучения |
|---|---|
| ОК-8 | владеть культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владением культурой устной и письменной речи\ |
| ОК-9 | способность применять методы и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития, повышения культурного уровня, профессиональной компетенции, сохранения своего здоровья, нравственного и физического самосовершенствования |
| ОПК – 7 | способность представлять специфику иноязычной научной картины мира, основные особенности научного дискурса в государственном языке Российской Федерации и изучаемых иностранных языках |
| ОПК – 31 | владеть навыками организации НИР и управления научно-исследовательским коллективом |
| ПК-16 | владеть методикой предпереводческого анализа текста, способствующей точному восприятию исходного высказывания, подготовки к выполнению перевода, включая поиск информации в справочной, специальной литературе и компьютерных сетях |

| ПК-17 | владеть способами достижения эквивалентности в переводе и способностью применять адекватные приемы перевода |
|---|---|
| ПК-18 | способность осуществлять письменный перевод с соблюдением норм лексической эквивалентности, соблюдением грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм |
| ПК-28 | уметь работать с основными информационно-поисковыми и экспертными системами, системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа, автоматического синтеза, распознавания и понимания речи, обработки лексикографической информации и автоматизированного перевода, автоматизированными системами идентификации и верификации |
| ПК-29 | владеть методами когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методами создания метаязыков |
| ПК-30 | владеть современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики |

## 2. Перечень оценочных средств

Таблица 3.

| № | Наименование оценочного средства | Характеристика оценочного средства | Представление оценочного средства в ФОС |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Разноуровневые задачи | Средство, позволяющее оценить уровень знаний обучающегося путем творческого решения им задания по реферированию и аннотированию аутентичного текста. | Задания для реферирования и аннотирования аутентичных текстов |

**3. Описание показателей и критериев оценивания результатов обучения на различных этапах формирования компетенций**

Таблица 4.

| Код компете нции | Уровень освоения компетенци и | Показатели достижения компетенции | Критерии оценивания результатов обучения |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Знает | |
| ОК-8,9; ОПК-7, 31; ПК-16, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30 | Недостаточн ый уровень. Оценка «незачтено», «неудовлетв орительно» | Не знает основные элементы системы лингвопереводческого анализа текста, системы предпереводческого анализа, послепереводческого саморедактирования и контрольного редактирования текста перевода. | Допускает много ошибок, недостаточно знает систему предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, не способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, не способен применять методы и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития. |
| | Базовый уровень Оценка «зачтено», «удовлетвор ительно» | Знает некоторые элементы системы лингвопереводческого анализа текста, предпереводческого анализа, послепереводческого саморедактирования и контрольного редактирования текста перевода. | Допускает ошибки и самостоятельно их не устраняет; знает основные элементы системы предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, в основном способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять методы и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития. |
| | Средний уровень Оценка «зачтено», «хорошо» | Знает основные элементы системы лингвопереводческого анализа текста, системы предпереводческого анализа, послепереводческого саморедактирования и контрольного редактирования текста перевода. | Иногда допускает ошибки, но самостоятельно их устраняет; знает основные элементы системы предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода; в основном способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять методы и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития. |
| | Высокий уровень. Оценка | Знает систему лингвопереводческого анализа текста, систему предпереводческого анализа, | Не допускает ошибок; в совершенстве знает основные элементы системы предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, в полной степени способен |

| | «зачтено», «отлично» | послепереводческого саморедактирования и контрольного редактирования текста перевода. | на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять весь комплекс методов и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Умеет | |
| | Базовый уровень | В некоторой степени умеет работать с основными информационно-поисковыми и экспертными системами, системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа; умеет осуществлять письменный перевод с соблюдением норм лексической эквивалентности, соблюдением грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм | В основном способен работать с частью информационно-поисковых и экспертных систем, с системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа; в основном умеет осуществлять письменный перевод аутентичных текстов, однако допускает ошибки в соблюдении норм лексической эквивалентности, в соблюдении грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм |
| | Средний уровень | В основном умеет работать с основными информационно-поисковыми и экспертными системами, системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа, умеет осуществлять письменный перевод с соблюдением норм лексической эквивалентности, соблюдением грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм | В основном способен работать с большей частью информационно-поисковых и экспертных систем, с системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа; в основном умеет осуществлять письменный перевод аутентичных текстов, иногда допускает ошибки в соблюдении норм лексической эквивалентности, в соблюдении грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм, однако самостоятельно их устраняет |
| | Высокий уровень | Умеет работать с основными информационно-поисковыми и экспертными системами, системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа, умеет осуществлять письменный перевод с соблюдением норм лексической эквивалентности, соблюдением грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм | В совершенстве способен работать со всем комплексом информационно-поисковых и экспертных систем, с системами представления знаний, синтаксического и морфологического анализа; адекватно умеет осуществлять письменный перевод аутентичных текстов, не допускает ошибки в соблюдении норм лексической эквивалентности, в соблюдении грамматических, синтаксических и стилистических норм. |

| | | Владеет | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Базовый уровень | Владеет в некоторой степени культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет частью методов когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методов создания метаязыков; владеет навыками организации НИР и управления научно-исследовательским коллективом | Владеет некоторыми элементами методики предпереводческого анализа текста, лингвопереводческого анализа текста, предпереводческого анализа, послепереводческого саморедактирования и контрольного редактирования текста перевода; в основном правильно использует минимальный набор переводческих соответствий, достаточный для качественного устного перевода, однако допускает ошибки; владеет частью методов когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методов создания метаязыков |
| | Средний уровень | В основном владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет частью методов когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методов создания метаязыков; владеет навыками организации НИР и управления научно-исследовательским коллективом, в основном владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз данных. | В основном владеет навыками организации НИР и управления научно-исследовательским коллективом, владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет частью методов когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методов создания метаязыков; владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики |
| | Высокий уровень | Владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения; владеет навыками организации НИР; владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения, представления информации и баз данных; владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления | В совершенстве владеет навыками организации НИР и управления научно-исследовательским коллективом, владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет всем комплексом методов когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методов создания метаязыков; владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз |

| | | баз данных; владеет культурой устной и письменной речи, методами когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методами создания метаязыков | данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики |
|---|---|---|---|

## 4. Методические материалы, определяющие процедуры оценивания результатов обучения, характеризующих этапы формирования компетенций

Критерии оценки владения компетенциями ОК-8,- 9; ОПК-7, -31; ПК-16, -17, -18, -28, -29, -30 при ведении научно-исследовательской работы.

Оценка «ОТЛИЧНО» ставится, если:

- студент в полном соответствии с требованиями осуществил аннотацию и реферирование научного текста, правильно определил ключевые слова научной статьи;

- продемонстрировал полное владение системой предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, в полной степени способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять весь комплекс методов и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития; владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет всем комплексом методов когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методов создания метаязыков; владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики.

Оценка «ХОРОШО» ставится, если:

- студент с незначительным отступлением от требований осуществил аннотацию и реферирование научного текста, правильно определил ключевые слова научной статьи;

- в основном продемонстрировал владение системой предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять весь комплекс методов и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития; владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет основными методами когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методами создания метаязыков; владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики.

Оценка «УДОВЛЕТВОРИТЕЛЬНО» ставится, если:

- студент с ошибками осуществил аннотацию и реферирование научного текста, недостаточно точно определил ключевые слова научной статьи;

- продемонстрировал владение частью методов предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять основные методы и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития; в основном владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; владеет главными методами когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методами создания метаязыков; владеет современными методиками сбора,

хранения и представления баз данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики.

Оценка «НЕУДОВЛЕТВОРИТЕЛЬНО» ставится, если: студент :

- с грубыми ошибками осуществил аннотацию и реферирование научного текста, неправильно определил ключевые слова текста научной статьи;

- не смог продемонстрироватть владение основными методами предпереводческого анализа текста, послепереводческого саморедактирования текста перевода, не способен на научной основе организовать свою самостоятельную профессиональную деятельность, способен применять лишь часть методов и средства познания, обучения и самоконтроля для своего интеллектуального развития; плохо владеет культурой мышления, способностью к анализу, обобщению информации, постановке целей и выбору путей их достижения, плохо владеет культурой устной и письменной речи; в незначительной степени владеет методами когнитивного и формального моделирования естественного языка и методами создания метаязыков; не в полной мере владеет современными методиками сбора, хранения и представления баз данных и знаний в интеллектуальных системах различного назначения с учетом достижений корпусной лингвистики.

Критерии оценки (в баллах):

- 50-60 баллов выставляется студенту, если он:

- демонстрирует ограниченное владение методами научно-исследовательской работы;

- с искажением смысла выполнил задание по аннотации, реферированию текстов научных статей, осуществил обобщение информации;

– научно-исследовательская задача не полностью выполнена или выполнена не в полном объеме;

- содержание выполненной НИР не соответствует поставленной в задании задаче;

– допускаются многочисленные ошибки, которые затрудняют понимание результатов НИР.


- 61-75 баллов выставляется студенту, если он:

- демонстрирует владение основными методами научно-исследовательской работы;

- выполнил задание по аннотации, реферированию текстов научных статей, осуществил обобщение информации;

– в основном выполнил научно-исследовательскую задачу;

- содержание выполненной НИР соответствует поставленной в задании задаче;

– допущены ошибкив выполненном исследовании, которые самостоятельно устранены.

- 76-90 баллов выставляется студенту, если он

- демонстрирует владение большей частью методов научно-исследовательской работы;

- выполнил в небольшими погрешностями задание по аннотации, реферированию текстов научных статей, осуществил обобщение информации;

– выполнил научно-исследовательскую задачу;

- содержание выполненной НИР соответствует поставленной в задании задаче;

– в выполненном исследовании не допущены ошибки.

- 91-100 баллов выставляется студенту, если он:

 - демонстрирует владение всем комплексом методов научно-исследовательской работы;

- без ошибок выполнил задание по аннотации, реферированию текстов научных статей, осуществил обобщение информации;

– выполнил научно-исследовательскую задачу;

- содержание выполненной НИР соответствует поставленной в задании задаче;

 – в выполненном исследовании не допущены ошибки.

**5. Материалы для проведения текущего контроля и промежуточной аттестации.**

Комплект заданий по практике « Научно-исследовательская работа» (2) для аннотации, реферирования, определения ключевых слов научных статей.

Текст 1.  Persuading Science: The Art of Scientific Rhetoric

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236757737_The_Rhetoric_of_Scienc

"If there are no universal and precise methodological rules, how do scientists, during a theory-change, come to convince or convert their community to a new theory or way of seeing the world?" "We take rhetoric as the art of persuasive argumentation; we thus aim at debating its role, nature, limits as well as efficacy" (Pera and Shea, pp. 99, 173). With this question and proposition, selected historians and philosophers of science were invited to an international conference in Naples on science and rhetoric. Even as these scholars werepresenting their papers in June 1990, Alan Gross's book was being printed. These two volumes, one the result of a gathering of minds,the other the result of one person's [End Page 279] efforts over a period of time, can serve to signal the arrival of rhetorical studies ofscience as a distinct intellectual program, and together they provide an introduction to the issues, methods, and insights that rhetoricoffers to the more general critical examination of science. The two volumes are similar, not only in their basic agendas, but also in several other revealing ways. Both are essentially collections ofessays--separate studies, separately conceived--rather than extended or integrated arguments. Both feature a few central figures in thehistory of science, who are now seen as definitively revolutionary: Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Darwin, Einstein. Both make Aristotle the central figure in their theory of rhetoric: in Pera and Shea, Aristotle has more index citations than anyone else, and the editors see the work in the volume as a "return to Aristotle" (p. x); Gross calls Aristotle's Rhetoric his "master theoretical text" (p.3) but acknowledges that Aristotelian rhetoric can use some updating (p. 18). These similarities are perhaps a bit surprising from a disciplinary perspective. Alan Gross, a professor of English, has been studying and writing about scientific rhetoric for some tenyears-- while all the contributors to the other volume are historians and philosophers of science, most of whom have come only recently to an interest in rhetoric and at least one of whom (Richard S. Westfall) confesses himself an amateur: "I have never formally studied the discipline of rhetoric... when I speak of 'rhetoric' I employ a wholly intuitive, common sense understanding of the word" (p. 107). Pera and Shea's collection of ten previously unpublished essays is divided into two equal sections, the first group making the generalcase about the relevance of rhetoric to science and the second group providing more detailed study of specific cases, with a heavy emphasis on the seventeenth century. As a whole, the collection

demonstrates the great advantage that historians can bring to the study of scientific rhetoric--that is, their rich and detailed knowledge of specific figures, texts, events, and their relationships. The essays in thefirst section, although they claim nothing that will be new to rhetoricians, may have an interesting persuasiveness for those who are not familiar with rhetorical approaches to science: they serve as unsolicited testimonials. Readers with some background in rhetoric will find the second group of essays by far the more informative and illuminating: Richard S. Westfall describes the differences between the audiences that Galileo and Newton addressed, suggesting that Galileo had to create an audience, which then existed for Newton; Shea shows that Descartes, who forswore rhetoric, cannot be understood without the aid of rhetoric; Peter Machamer characterizes seventeenth century scientific rhetoric as person-centered, or perspectival, a quality that Newton's achievements ended; Maurizio Mamiani shows that Newton used similar strategies in his attempts to create certainty in the Opticks, the Principia, and his interpretationof the Apocalypse; and Gerald Holton demonstrates that two papers in twentieth-century physics (by Bohr and Einstein) can be understood as dramas or conversations among several actors: the scientist playing out his own earlier work, the scientist looking to the direction of future work, and important colleagues as they respond to the works. Indeed, many of the essays emphasize the rhetorica role of the scientific community and the rhetorical qualities of scientific discourse as addressed. Gross's book is both topically and methodologically diverse, in part because many of its chapters have been previously published separately. It includes a chapter comparing James Watson's Double Helix with the Nature paper that [End Page 280] announced the structure of DNA; another examining the rhetorical force of the conventions for arranging both observational and theoretical scientific papers; one showing that an essential part of the Copernican scientific revolution was the creation of a "model for radical intellectual change" (p. 98); one showing that close attention to the syntax in Darwin's notebooks can reveal the epistemic status of his notations and the long progress of self-persuasion (However, Gross does not mention the similar and more detailed study of Darwin's notebook sby John Angus Campbell ["Scientific Discovery and Rhetorical Invention," in The Rhetorital Turn: Invention and Persuasion in theConduct of Inquiry, ed. Herbert W. Simons (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 58-90]; it is also interesting that Philip Kitcher's essay in Pera and Shea makes a very similar point about Darwin's process of self-persuasion in the notebooks); and another exploring the particular ontological force of the syntax and diction of scientific prose. The studies are often ingenious: the use, forexample, of a case of scientific fraud to examine the nature of linguistic reference, and failure of reference; the use of a text by one of Copernicus's obscure students to develop the model of rational conversion. But in two of the chapters it would be helpful to know more about the materials being analyzed (collections of contemporary texts that are not completely described or identified). http://muse.jhu.edu.www.lib.ncsu.edu:2048/journals/configurations/v001/1.2br_gross... 1 of 23/11/11) Gross's book does have a rhetorical frame. The first chapter presents a brief survey of the relevance of the

Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric to science and suggests that the tradition must be updated. Six chapters in the middle of the book are organized under the rubric "style, arrangement, and invention," but the frame is not explained or foregrounded in the chapters themselves, and the updating of the classical tradition is done in an ad hoc way, with each chapter drawing on a different set of conceptual resources (ranging from Habermas to Propp to H. P Grice and Victor Turner). One learns more from this book about science than about rhetoric, since the rhetorical agenda is both static and monolithic: static because each chapter makes basically the same point, that scientific concepts and theories are rhetorical constructions; and monolithic because, as the title of the book intimates (the rhetoric of science), there is no attempt to explore whether different disciplines or different historical periods or different scientists are rhetorically distinct. The differences, for example, between Descartes and Newton, or between experimental and theoretical reports, are ultimately attributed to the science, not to the rhetoric, even though the essence of Gross's "radical rhetoric of science" is that you can not tell the science from the rhetoric. These features of the book can perhaps be best understood from the vantage of the epilogue, in which Gross challenges the commitment of Western philosophy to metaphysical realism, arguing instead that the rhetorical view of science invites--or even necessitates—both metaphysical skepticism and epistemological relativism. He labels this view "radical," and in a subsequent essay he calls it "rhetoric of science without constraints" ("Rhetoric of Science without Constraints," Rhetorica 9 [1991]: 283-299). He tackles the arguments of philosophers of science, building his case, as he puts it, "from within the stronghold of analytic philosophy" (p. 194). The only realism Gross can endorse is what he calls "motivational realism," (p. 200)--that is, the fundamental faith that scientists must have in the existence of the world they study in order to make their research meaningful. Gross's case is both thoroughgoing and, a reasonable view of what the rhetorical perspective entails, but whether it will convince analytic philosophers is another question. [End Page 281]Although both these books offer rhetoric as the solution to a philosophical problem, both also continue to enact the intellectual subservience of rhetoric to philosophy. The essays in the Pera and Shea collection are framed as responses to a crisis in the philosophy of science, created, as Pera puts it in his contribution, by the opposition between the Scylla of certainty and the Charybdis of subjectivity(p. 49). And Gross's book is really an argument for the legitimation of rhetorical approaches to science, an argument addressed ultimately to philosophy. As the list of contributors to the Pera and Shea collection shows, some philosophers, at least, may be willing to listen.

Текст 2. Social Media in Ecuador: Impact on Journalism Practice and Citizens' Understanding of Public Politics

Since the emergence of the Internet, digital journalism has undergone a significant transformation, as a result of a myriad of organizational, industrial and technological challenges that have affected the news business (Deuze and Witschge 2018). Readers' consumption patterns have changed dramatically as well (Goyanes 2018), due to the popularization of social media platforms and their growing relevance in news sharing, dissemination and discussion (Swart, Peters, and Broersma 2018). According to recent market research, most people obtain news on social media, even though many have concerns about its accuracy (Matsa and Shearer 2018). News-workers have also adapted their professional skills to the become the benchmark of the business (Hermida 2010). In this context, a growing demanding digital realm, in which the immediacy and omnipresence of news on social media have number of media scholars are concerned about the potentially distorted effects that social media might have on journalistic practice and thus on citizens'understanding of current events and politics. However, extant research focused mostly on global North communities (Fletcher and Nielsen 2019; Shehata and Strömbäck 2018), pre-vents us from gleaning more evidence on how technological revolutions like the Internet or social media affect journalism practices beyond the Western world. This article explores how journalists in Ecuador are using social media platforms and how, in turn, they are changing journalistic practices. Through 40 in-depth interviews with news-workers from different regional and national news organizations, we try to eluidate how journalists are transforming journalism and are transformed by the consolidation of social media platforms for professional duties. We employed the world-systems theory as benchmark framework in order to position and compare our observations with the theoretical insights proposed by central Euro-American scholarships. Drawing upon this perspective, we also identify both systemic (global) and antisystemic (resistant) processes whereby Ecuadorian journalist make sense of their professional roles. Our findings first describe the professional culture of Ecuadorian journalism in a world-systemic framework, reflecting upon its nature and main idiosyncratic features. We also empirically illustrate the heightened role of immediacy on social media platforms to articu-late the news production process of most news organizations, giving rise to a new wave of sensationalism, while reinforcing the traditional role of journalists as watchdogs. This article contributes to the budding literature on de-Westernization in communication sciences (Waisbord 2019), providing an inductive angle that displays both pull and push effects in the context of the globalization of journalism.

Latin America and Ecuador in the World-System. As a consequence of a growingly globalized world, social subsystems that have thus farbeen investigated on a national or regional level should be analyzed with respect to global power relations (Demeter 2019). As Chase-Dunn puts it (1999), our societal fields (i.e., economy, politics, culture or communication) are globally interconnected in a way that all participators have their specific power position. The founding father of the world-systemic perspective,

Immanuel Wallerstein argues (2004), that these societal reali-ties are not separate from the dynamics of the overall world-system, but rather play essential parts in its operation. Galtung (1971) even assumes that these subsystems—including education, popular culture and media industry—help to maintain the hegemony of the Euro-American center through the circulation of central values and professional culture.As a branch of world-systems analysis, world polity research specifically investigates therole of culturally oriented organizational and institutional processes (Cole 2017; Meyeret al. 1997). This tradition states that different—collective or individual—participants in the world system are "embedded in and shaped by a global cultural, social, and political environment, resulting in a great deal of decoupled isomorphism among them"(Cole2017, 86).In the case of journalism studies, this feature can be illustrated in at least three established traditions. First, as we have already mentioned, extant research on journalism practices and professional standards mostly deal with central regions in terms of both theoretical and empirical approaches (Antunovic, Parsons, and Cooke 2018; Costera Meijer and Groot Kormelink 2015; Hermida 2010). Second, Western types of media structure and professional practices are usually considered as international or even as ideal implementations of professional journalistic standards (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Third, even if media systems beyond the Western world are considered (Mihelj and Huxtable2018), they are analyzed from a Western central point of view, while peripheral perspectives or decolonized epistemologies are usually ignored (Hallin and Mancini 2012). Thus,an inductive analysis of the professional standards of peripheral regions (like Ecuador) is essential, as it might hint at potential directions to counteract and challenge established discourses on journalism practices and professional role models established in the West. According to Wallerstein, the world-system is an international and multicultural network in which different necessities—money, labor power, energy, knowledge, information and so on—flow (Wallerstein 1974a,1974b,1979). The world-system is such thatit includes different nations with different cultures, languages, norms, institutions and values. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997b) defines world-systems as "intersocietal networks in which the interactions (e.g., trade, warfare, intermarriage, information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantlyaffect changes that occur in these local structures"(Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997b, 403).From our point of view, the most important feature of the world-system is that it tends to develop a typical core–periphery (Wallerstein 1979) or core semiperiphery structure(Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997b). Accordingly, we must first determine the systemic position of our analyzed region in order to be able to use a global perspective. In Hall and Chase-Dunn's generalized model (2006), Latin America is an important example of semi-peripheries. According to the hypothesis of semiperipheral development, transformational changes are mainly brought about by the actions of individuals andorganizations within polities that are semiperipheral relative to the other polities in the same system (Chase-Dunn and Morasin 2013). Semiperipheral regions are relevant in the understanding of the world-system's operation since, as mediating agents, they produce both systemic acts whereby they tend to move along with the center, and

anti-systemic counter-movements (Robinson 2008) through which they try to resist central influence (Wallerstein 1990). According to both empirical measurements (Kentor 2000,2008) and historical analysis (Frank 1967; Mahoney 2012), Latin America counts as a semiperiphery in the world-system, meaning that such countries share important semi-peripheral commonalities including low to middle GDP per capita, high to moderate economic dependence, indigenous rebellions, anti-colonial struggles for independence and autonomy, foreign intervention, and so on (Galeano 1987).The accurate position of a given country in the world-system can be determined by a matrix that deals with both geopolitical position and development (Kentor 2008), and sys-temic attitude (Chase-Dunn and Morasin 2013). Based on the variables that have been developed by Kentor (2000,2008), Chase-Dunn and Morasin (2013) considered Ecuadoras a peripheral country, as opposed with other, more developed Latin-American nation ssuch as Brazil or Mexico, generally considered as semi-peripheral regions. Peripherality here refers to the geopolitical and developmental position of Ecuador. Regarding systemic attitudes through which peripheral regions relate to the center, in Latin America, there arenon-progressive countries that sympathize with neoliberal values, Western ideologies and where social welfare measures are not a high priority of state policy. Typical examples are Colombia and Mexico. Progressive countries could be both reformist or antisystemic (Smith and Wiest 2012). An antisystemic regime, according to Wallerstein (1990) argues hat neither liberty nor equality is possible under the current world-system, so in order tobe free and equal, the system should be changed. Reformists are less radical, since besidesbeing internally progressive, they do not oppose international relations and international free trade policies. Based on a historical/political analysis, Chase-Dunn and Morasin (2013)considered Argentina and Brazil as progressive, reformist countries, while seeing Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba as progressive and also antisystemic countries. Thus, in a world-systemic matrix, Ecuador might be viewed as a peripheral antisystemic country.

Social Media and Journalism in Ecuador. Ecuadorian journalism is determined by the state of private media companies in the country, with four main characteristics (Becerra 2014): the absence of a concept of public service in the scope of private media; the existence of big media conglomerates that affect content diversity (Mastrini and Becerra 2007); intra-state interactions where cities establish a center/periphery relationship with the rest of the country; and finally, a media system that has evolved under low regulation, but under a great degree of control by governments and business owners (Fox and Waisbord 2002). Regarding the latter, in 2008, Ecuador passed a new constitutional document whose implementation progressively reinforced state action, leading to political, economic, social and even media changes. Journalism has been subjected to more significant interference through newlaws and regulations with respect to media licensing, radio frequencies, content, andthe increase in state-owned media companies, as well as community media (OllerAlonso and Chavero Ramírez 2014). In a study about the situation of journalism in Latin America (Saldaña and Mourao 2018), findings indicate that the

main professional challenges facing Ecuadorian journalists are connected with political and economic pressure, censure or lack of transparency, corruption and crime. In relation to Ecuadorian professional profiles, more than two thirds of news-workers are male, with a university degree (66.3% hold a bachelor's degree, 11.3% have a master's degree, and 2.5% a doctorate), and an average age of 35 years (Oller Alonsoet al. 2016). This figure shows a paucity of resistance to digital transformations, as mostof them are digital natives. In fact, although a high percentage of Ecuadorian journalists have a bachelor's degree (Gonzáles Córdova 2016), they are generally unhappy with the training they have received. This is mainly due to the disparity between the skills learned in the classroom and those actually required for the profession (Atala, Chéné,and Panamá 2017). In addition, according to Odriozola Chené, Aguirre Mayorga, and Bernal Suárez (2016), Facebook is the most popular channel among journalists (68%), followed by Twitter (64%).Problem Statement and Research QuestionsRegarding world-systemic attitudes, we can assume that both pull and push effects playimportant roles among journalists in Ecuador. First, there should be systemic movementsthat pull the journalistic culture towards central (Western) values, attitudes and policies. Animportant feature of the pro-Western attitude is a sort of inferiority complex where by Ecuadorian media may prefer to copy Western program formats, while a clear identity of Ecuadorian media is still missing (Punín-Larrea, Martínez, and Rencoret 2014). Another pro-systemic dynamic of the Ecuadorian media might be related to the growing importance of the Internet and social media sites, both products of the West (Jordan 2013).Thus, for every world region of the global South (Rigg 2007), the penetration of the Inter-net and the popularity of social media go hand in hand with the dissemination of Western cultural values (Thomas-Slayter 2003).Regarding push effects, globalization has also given birth to anti-globalization and anti-systemic movements, especially in more or less progressive parts of the global South(Braveboy-Wagner 2009). Thus, an anti-Western attitude may also be presumedamongst journalists in Ecuador or, at least, we can expect an ambivalent positiontowards Western journalistic values and traditions. As Thomas-Slayter (2003) puts it,regions of the global South rightly fear some level of cultural annihilation from thecenter and, as a consequence, there are widespread waves of emancipation, self-respectand self-determination. On the other hand, there is also a desire to espouse the Western way of life with cell phones, fast Internet, science and technology, leading to a situation of conflicting desires to both reject and embrace Westernization, and one which is characteristic of the global South (Thomas-Slayter 2003). Since in Ecuador, the vast majority of journalists are male, under 40 and have a university degree in communications or journalism (Oller Alonso et al. 2016) we can assume that they have a somewhat higher degree of commitment to international (central) values that would balance their antisystemic attitudes (Chase-Dunn and Morasin 2013). Based on our theoretical considerations and the position that Ecuador holds in the world-system, we formulated ourresearch questions

Текст 3. Big data analytics

Big Data are large and complex datasets that cannot be manipulated using traditional processing techniques. They are platforms where recording, measuring, and capturing of data occurs (Lee, 2018). Six defining attributes of Big Data are volume, variety, velocity, veracity, variability and complexity, and value (Gandomi and Haider, 2015). Volume represents the magnitude of data usually measured in units such as terabytes and petabytes. Attribute 'variety' is the structural heterogeneity in a dataset, while velocity is the rate at which data are generated. Veracity defines the unreliability traits in data sources, while variability is the variation exhibited in data flow rates. The attribute 'value' is the insight from analysis to aid decision making. Some of these attributes are evident in a typical large construction incident dataset that is heterogeneous and dynamic (Fenrick et al., 2012). Aside from volume and veracity, value is another key attribute used in this study. Value gives a measure of information extracted from datasets for optimal control decisions to mitigate risks. The Big Data analytics inspect, clean, transform, and model the Big Data to discover useful information to support decision-making (Bilal et al., 2016). It is also a suite of techniques and processes that allow businesses to process, organize, visualize, and analyze data to produce insights for data-driven operational planning, decision-making, and execution (Lee, 2018). Big Data analytics is intellectually rich and borrows from related fields such as statistics, data mining, business analytics, and knowledge discovery from data (KDD). Its forms are descriptive, predictive, prescriptive. A variety of software packages such as R language, MATLAB, Hyperion, and Tableau can be used for the various analytical forms. However, the R language is used in this study for predictive analytics.

Common attributes for modelling occupational accident    The three biggest safety hazards on construction sites are widely acknowledged to be excavations, working at height, and movement of vehicles and plant machinery (Hinze and Teizer, 2011). Variables attributable to construction health and safety risk are enormous. These include environmental conditions, poor work practices, ignorance, work pressure, and time constraint (Törner and Pousette, 2009). Others are the working surface condition, human error, harsh temperature, equipment failure action, materials handling equipment, employment contract, experience, and animal or insect attack. The task (operation) to be performed, sex, employee age, day, time amongst others have also been used in estimating the distribution of work accident risk (Bailey et al., 2007, Cheng et al., 2012). Tasks in a power infrastructure project may include wiring, excavating, stringing cables, blasting, cutting, pulling, erecting structures, lifting, loading/offloading, and jointing. Table 1 depicts the summary of previous research employing these attributes in occupational safety modeling.  Analytics techniques for health and safety risk modeling . Several studies in the literature (Sánchez et al., 2011, Liu and Tsai, 2012, Rubio-romero et al., 2013, Pinto, 2014, Yorio et al., 2014, Sanchez et al., 2015) have discussed the use of either statistical analysis or machine learning (ML) techniques for modelling occupational accidents in construction projects. For example, statistical analysis proponents have applied a bivariate approach (Paul and Maiti, 2007) and Poisson models (Yorio et al., 2014) for modeling workplace safety. However, due to the

huge amount of data, ML techniques supersede traditional statistical counterparts in prediction problems, and in addition to their remarkable results, they have been used in various fields such as engineering, medical science, finance (Witten et al., 2013). Examples of machine learning techniques commonly used for modeling occupational injuries are linear regression, support vector machines, decision trees, RF, and artificial neural networks. A logistic regression model was used to predict roof fall injuries (Soltanzadeh et al., 2016), but the model cannot appropriately capture nonlinear relationships among variables (Tixier et al., 2016). The fuzzy logic was used to model safety risk assessment (Pinto, 2014). However, fuzzy systems are incapable of generalizing without alterations to the rule base. Due to its ability to learn from data, artificial neural networks (ANN) have been employed for work-related injury risk analysis (Zurada, 2012, Rubio-romero et al., 2013, Goha et al., 2018). However, ANN suffers from interpretability functionality and the difficulty in determining the number of layers and neurons. The adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system has also been employed for work-related risk analysis (Ciarapica and Giacchetta, 2009). Support vector machines (SVM) due to their low computational costs and a unique optima solution have been used to classify workers suffering work-related injuries (Sánchez et al., 2011, Zurada, 2012). However, its computational complexity grows exponentially with the size of training samples. Bayesian networks are desirable for making inferences in cases where the input data is incomplete. They have been used to study the influence of working conditions on occupational accidents (García-Herrero et al., 2012). A fundamental difficulty in applying Bayesian networks is the computational complexity of evaluating these networks. The K-nearest neighbor (kNN) method, due to its simplicity has been used to classify workers according to their risk of suffering musculoskeletal disorders (Zurada, 2012, Sanchez et al., 2015), and to evaluate the relative importance of different cognitive factors in influencing safety behavior (Goha et al., 2018). However, kNN has difficulties in classifying close objects originating from different classes correctly. Other ML techniques such as decision tree (Zurada, 2012, Goha et al., 2018), random forest (Zurada, 2012, Tixier et al., 2016, Goha et al., 2018), and gradient boosting machine (Tixier et al., 2016) have also been applied to model work-place injuries due to their high accuracies. However, many conventional ML algorithms suffer from over-fitting and have challenges in addressing the massive amount of irrelevant or redundant attributes for Big Data analytics. In this era of Big Data analytics with numerous data types and advanced information technologies, new challenges are emerging regarding the computing requirements and strategies for data processing and analysis. The advent of Big Data calls for innovative methods for precise estimation of the safety effects of risk factors, and hotspots identification with higher resolution. Besides, in Big Data analytics, it is difficult to get ready-made ML algorithms to eliminate redundant features and achieve a decrease in the signal to noise ratio. Eliminating unrelated attributes will reduce ML algorithms running times and produce a more efficient classifier. Conventional ML techniques do not produce good results if their parameters are not tuned. Optimization techniques such as particle swarm optimization (PSO), ant colony optimization, and genetic algorithms are often used for tuning ML techniques' parameters. PSO, which has been employed in several areas, especially, for feature selection (Unler and Murat, 2010, Xue et al., 2014), is an evolutionary computing technique depending on swarm intelligence. It has better performance when compared with the genetic algorithm (Chakraborty, 2008). Based on the reviewed literature, and to the best of authors' knowledge, optimization techniques are a novel approach for tuning the parameters of the GBM technique to enhance its prediction accuracy. Also, there are limited studies on accident modeling and prevention in the power infrastructure domain. The available studies focused more on construction, mining, and shipbuilding industries. Therefore, in this

paper, PSO is selected both for features selection and optimization of GBM parameters. The optimized Gradient Boosting Machine -Particle Swarm Optimization (GBM-PSO) model's prediction ability is benchmarked with the decision trees, random forest, and GBM techniques. We chose the tree-based techniques to benchmark the proposed model because they are highly accurate (Goha et al., 2018). They also require minimum data preprocessing and are capable of fitting highly nonlinear data (Hastie et al., 2009). Dataset and analysis The authors obtained a privately maintained health and safety dataset containing 1,607,010 data points. This dataset represents incident cases that occurred over the past seventeen years from a leading UK utility infrastructure company. The dataset has various features about utility infrastructure projects (i.e., overhead lines, underground cabling, and onshore/offshore substations). The performance of classifiers depends on the quality of the data used (Tixier et al., 2016). Thus, we employed string processing techniques to retrieve useful underlying concepts contained in few text-free columns to provide valuable additional information to impact the classifier's performance. String processing techniques manipulate raw texts and convert them to tokens. Tokens are used to build document-term matrix (DTM). The retrieved information is then used to complete columns with missing or null entries (e.g., project type, employee experience, and task). We anonymized data to protect the privacy of the subjects. We follow the recommendation by Sarkar et al. [36] and convert the categorical data to numeric since numerical attributes hold more information than categorical attributes. For columns with missing entries that cannot be completed with the text processing approach, we use the k-nearest neighbor (kNN). In kNN, K nearest neighbors are selected from the complete cases, so that they minimize a similarity measure. If we assume a data set D, defined in Eq. (1), is composed of N labeled incomplete patterns or cases, $(1) D=X,T,M={x_j,t_j,m_j}_{j=1}^M$ where $x_j={x_{1j},x_{2j},\cdots,x_{dj}}^T$ is the $j^{th}$ input vector composed of d features; labeled as $t_j \in {C_1,C_2,\cdots.C_c}$; $C_i$ represents classes, and $m_j={m_{1j},m_{2j},\cdots,m_{dj}}^T$ indicates which input features are unknown in $x_j$. Then X is an $d \times N$ matrix representing the input data set, T is a row vector $(1 \times N)$ representing the target set, and M is a binary $d \times N$ matrix. X can be divided into two parts based on M as $X={X_o,X_m}$, where $X_o$ and $X_m$ represent the complete and incomplete cases. Given an incomplete pattern $\times$, $U={u_j}_{j=1}^K$ represents the set of its K nearest neighbors (according to a distance metric, computed as $d{x_p,x_q}=\sum_{i=1}^n {x_{ip}-x_{ip}}^2$, $x_p$ and $x_q$ are input vectors of an $i^{th}$ feature) arranged in increasing order of their distance. Once the nearest neighbors are found, a replacement value to substitute the missing attribute value is determined using the mean value of their nearest neighbors. In this study, we substituted the missing entries using the means of their k-nearest neighbors determined using the Euclidean distance. We used the kNN technique because of its simplicity and relatively high accuracy (Eskelson et al., 2009). We noticed a low imbalanced data problem as there were fewer accident risks compared to no accident risks in the dataset for the classification problem. We used the SMOTE algorithm (Chawla et al., 2002) to balance the dataset. Outliers are also eliminated using a Box plot (BP) statistical method. BP can graphically convey the level and spread of a distribution of data values at a glance. It also provides information on data's symmetry and skewness and displays outliers, unlike other data display methods. BP presents five-number summary: the minimum, lower quartile ($\vartheta1$), median ($\vartheta2$), upper quartile ($\vartheta3$), and maximum. The range of the middle two quartiles is called the inter-quartile range ($IQR=\vartheta3-\vartheta1$). In detecting outliers, we employ a common rule: outliers are data points higher than $\vartheta3+1.5*IQR$ or lower than $\vartheta1-1.5*IQR$. In this study, we identified a few values that were included in this range and eliminated them appropriately. The final dataset after data cleansing has

1,349,239 data points. Methodology   We discuss in this section, methodology, data, exploratory analysis, and the overview of analytics methods employed. The goal of an exploratory data analysis

Текст 4.  CNN poll: Bernie Sanders surges to join Biden atop Democratic presidential pack

Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders has improved his standing in the national Democratic race for president, joining former Vice President Joe Biden in a two-person top tier above the rest of the field, according to a new CNN poll conducted by SSRS. Overall, 27% of registered voters who are Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents back Sanders, while 24% favor Biden. The margin between the two is within the poll's margin of sampling error, meaning there is no clear leader in this poll. Both, however, are significantly ahead of the rest of the field, including Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren at 14% and former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg at 11%. Former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg lands at 5% in the poll, while Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar and businessman Andrew Yang each hold 4% support. Businessman Tom Steyer has 2%. No other candidate reaches 1% support.Sanders has gained 7 points since the last CNN poll on the race in December. Since that survey, the Vermont senator has also made gains in early-state polling, including CNN's survey with the Des Moines Register in Iowa, where the first caucuses of the cycle will be held in less than two weeks. Sanders has made gains nearly across the board, clearly pulling away from Warren among liberals (33% back Sanders, while 19% support Warren in the new poll), a group where the two had been running closely through much of the fall. Sanders has also pulled about even with Biden among voters of color (30% for Sanders, 27% for Biden). The poll marks the first time Biden has not held a solo lead in CNN's national polling on the race. As the campaign has taken a more negative turn, Democratic voters remain about as enthusiastic about a potential Sanders nomination as they were earlier this fall (38% say they would be enthusiastic should he win the nomination, on par with the 39% who felt that way in October), while his chief rivals have seen enthusiasm waning (enthusiasm for a Biden nomination has dipped 9 points to 34%; for Warren, it's fallen 12 points to 29%).  Sanders is also most often seen as the candidate who agrees with voters on the issues that matter most to them (30% say that's Sanders compared with 20% for Biden, 15% for Warren and 10% for Buttigieg), and as the candidate who best understands the problems facing people like you (29% name Sanders as best on that measure, 18% Biden, 17% Warren and 9% Buttigieg). Biden remains the candidate a plurality of Democrats say has the best chance to defeat Trump (45% say so of Biden, compared with 24% for Sanders, 8% for Warren, 7% for Bloomberg and 4% for Buttigieg), but Sanders has made gains here too, rising from 16% on this question in December to 24% now. The share of Democrats who say nominating a candidate who can defeat Trump is more important than choosing one who agrees with them on the issues has rebounded to 57%, according to the poll. Sanders has made gains as the

preferred choice of potential Democratic voters who prioritize defeating the president as well: In December, 14% in this group backed him; now, 20% do so. That gain appears to have come at Warren's expense. Her share within this group dipped from 21% to 14%. Biden has held about even among this group, from 28% in December to 30% now. There's a similar dynamic between Sanders and Biden at play over uniting the country, with 39% saying Biden has the best shot at that while 22% name Sanders, but with Sanders gaining ground since December (14% named him in the December poll). Fewer think Sanders has the best shot to unite the Democratic Party, however, as just 16% name him, compared with 41% naming Biden. Looking ahead to the general election, the poll finds Biden, Bloomberg, Sanders and Warren each holding significant leads over Donald Trump, with the support of 50% or more of registered voters nationwide. Buttigieg tops Trump with 49% to the president's 45%, and Klobuchar and Trump are near even, 48% for Klobuchar to 45% for Trump. Enthusiasm for voting in the 2020 election appears to have dipped a bit from its December high point in the new poll, with the numbers declining by double digits among both Democrats and Republicans. Enthusiasm for voting has bounced a bit throughout CNN's polling this past fall, but has consistently remained at a higher level than is typical even for the fall of an election year. The drop in deep enthusiasm among Democrats was sharper than the one among Republicans, and the current poll finds the most enthusiastic voters leaning in Trump's direction in just about every matchup. The poll included an oversample of those living in 15 battleground states, defined as those where the race between Clinton and Trump in 2016 was decided by 8 points or fewer. In those states, the poll finds consistently tight races regardless of the nominees, with Democrats ranging from 46% to 49% support and Trump from 47% to 50%. In none of the six tested matchups does either candidate hold a significant advantage. Asked whether a woman can win the US presidency, a whopping 84% of voters say yes, but there is a notable gender divide here. While only 9% of men say a women could not win the U.S. presidency, that figure about doubles among women, 20% of whom say no, a woman cannot win the presidency. That figure stands at roughly 20% among women regardless of age, party, education level or race. The poll finds there continues to be a chasm between Democratic-leaning and Republican-leaning voters over the most important issues in their votes for president. For Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, health care (55% extremely important) and climate change (50%) dominate, with gun policy third (37%) while the economy (32%), immigration (32%) and foreign policy (31%) lag behind. For Republicans and Republican-leaners, just 27% cite health care as extremely important and only 8% consider climate change that important. At the top of their list is the economy (49% extremely important), followed by gun policy (41%) and immigration (36%). The CNN Poll was conducted by SSRS January 16 through 19 among a random national sample of 1,156 adults reached on landlines or cellphones by a live interviewer. Results for the full sample have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.4 percentage points. For the sample of 500 registered voters who are Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents, it is 5.3 percentage points.

Текст 5. Framing a mega-disaster: Political rhetoric

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Disasters threaten political careers and the stability of public institutions. They also create opportunities. Political actors are known to exploit crises and disasters to launch initiatives to change policies or institutions. A body of theoretical work has emerged that seeks to explain how and why political leaders react to crises and disasters. This article discusses these theories and investigates if and how these theories can be employed to understand the reactions of Chinese political leaders to the Wenchuan disaster. We identify three rhetorical building blocks that political leaders use to construct crisis frames. We then analyze the crisis frames that Chinese leaders used in the response to this disaster. We show that Chinese political leaders adopted a defensive strategy: they publicly recognized the earthquake as "big and bad," using exogenous reasoning to avoid accountability issues. They refrained from large-scale policy commitments. We explain how this frame is different from the dominant frame that emerged after the SARS crisis. On May 12, 2008, the Wenchuan mega-earthquake in Sichuan Province caused 69,226 deaths, injuring almost 375,000 people, leaving 18,000 missing and millions homeless, and relocating nearly 1.5 million residents.1 The theories about crisis exploitation, introduced above, would suggest that the Chinese government was in an excellent position to exploit the Wenchuan earthquake. The earthquake had exposed serious failures in key policies aimed at disaster reduction and prediction (Zhang, 2012, Zhang et al., 2016). At the same time, the government's handling of the disaster was widely depicted as successful (Heilmann, 2016, Kang, 2014). Yet, the Chinese elites did not seek to exploit this crisis (Liu, 2019). There was a clear precedent for exploiting a crisis in order to initiate large-scale reforms in China. Just a few years before, China had experienced the SARS crisis. After initially stonewalling international media and authorities alike, essentially concealing the serious nature of the epidemic, the Chinese leaders made a U-turn and organized an unprecedented and effective response (Liu, 2019). After the crisis, the government initiated large-scale policy reforms that would prove effective when the Bird Flu emerged in 2009. This paper explores how and why Chinese political leaders reacted to the Wenchuan earthquake. We study the framing strategies that these leaders employed and we seek to explain their choices. First, we discuss the theoretical perspective that helps to explain the policy implications of large-scale disasters. We review situational and temporal factors that are hypothesized to influence the choice of framing strategies. We then study the "earthquake rhetoric" of Chinese leaders. In the conclusion, we reflect on the usefulness of this theoretical approach. We define crisis as "a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimating the pre-existing socio-political order" ('t Hart, 1993 p. 39). Crises are considered "dynamic forces in ongoing processes of legitimization, delegitimization, and relegitimization" ('t Hart and Boin, 2001 p. 31). They can tarnish the legitimacy of government leaders and institutions, but they also provide opportunities to repair such damage (Sorace, 2016). This definition hints at the subjective nature of crisis definitions. Crises are social constructions, labels that societies collectively arrive at in their efforts to understand an emerging threat. That collective process of understanding a threat is often political in nature. It gives rise to a political contest on the nature of the crisis and the solutions that can

be employed (Boin et al., 2016, Hajer and Uitermark, 2008, Quarantelli, 1998, 't Hart, 1993). Political and societal stakeholders engage in this competition by constructing frames of the crisis (Olson and Gawronski, 2010, Stark, 2010, Tierney and Bevc, 2007). Framing is here defined as selecting "aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations" (Entman, 1993 p. 52). When political leaders frame a crisis to accomplish a goal that would not be achievable without a collectively experienced threat, we speak of crisis exploitation (Boin et al., 2009 p. 83). Crisis management is thus more than an operational response to minimize the consequences of a dire event. It is inherently political. The winning frame determines how society explains the crisis and how it seeks to deal with the crisis and its effects. Moreover, it may have implications for the survival of political leaders and institutions (Alink et al., 2001, Boin et al., 2008, Nohrstedt, 2011, 't Hart and Boin, 2001). We may thus assume that political leaders – incumbents and those in the opposition – will seek to forward frames that fit their perspective on both causes and solutions. In their efforts to build a winning frame, politicians in this competition can make use of three "building blocks" or rhetorical categories. By combining these building blocks, they create a story that explains the significance of the event, identifies causes and responsible actors, and sketches policy implications (Brändström and Kuipers, 2003; cf. Bovens and 't Hart, 1996, Boin et al., 2008, Furedi, 2010). Analysts can use these same categories to characterize the frames that actors use in the face of crisis. The first rhetorical category is used to explain how bad the situation is (according to the framer). This category contains optimistic descriptions ("we dodged the bullet") and downright dire rhetoric ("the mother of all storms"). Empirical research suggests that political leaders experience a dilemma here. Their immediate inclination is to offer "comparatively benign and complacent definitions" of the situation in an attempt to minimize political ramifications (Boin et al., 2009, 't Hart and Tindall, 2009). At the same time, public leaders cannot simply deny facts on the ground. In the case of disaster, they must acknowledge that the situation is significant, dangerous, and urgent (Boin et al., 2009). They cannot have it both ways. The second rhetorical category offers possible explanations about the causes of the crisis (these explanations, in turn, point to who might be responsible for the very occurrence of the crisis). The framer uses words that essentially answer the question that always emerges in the wake of crisis: How could this have happened? Empirical research identifies two dominant types of explanations. We might say that actors employ an "endogenous" frame when they claim that "the system is broken beyond repair," suggesting in the process that drastic actions are required. They launch an "exogenous" frame when they point to causes that are beyond the control of policymaking systems, diverting attention from possible policy failures. This latter frame typically is used to get existing systems "off the hook" (Boin et al., 2009). The third rhetorical category contains references to certain types of policy prescriptions. After a crisis, the question will arise what can or should be done to prevent similar crises in the future. Policymakers can aim for restoration efforts, which

typically are incremental and keep existing systems in place. They will employ language that emphasizes careful deliberation and cautious moves ("don't fix what ain't broke"). Alternatively, they can suggest the need for reform: they will call for "fundamental changes" that touch upon the paradigmatic foundations of the system (cf. Hall, 1993). The choices that actors make in each category appear to be somewhat path dependent. The first choice – "How bad is it?" – has implications for the other choices. Denial precludes the need to define causes and offer solutions. When political leaders adopt an endogenous frame, they might not get away with incremental change. An exogenous frame, on the other hand, would sit awkwardly with a proposal to revamp the entire system. We may thus expect that actual crisis frames – the sum of choices in each category – adhere to one of two ideal-types: "denial and resist change" v. "admit and adopt change." Empirical research suggests that most politicians reflexively opt for the first frame, but many are forced to move towards the second frame. A critical question is why politicians select one type of frame over the other. Why do they embrace responsibility or try to shift the blame? Why do they try to preserve rather than to reform? Theory suggests that the predisposition and endeavors of political leaders in response to a disaster are influenced by situational and contextual factors (Drennan et al., 2014, McCaffrie, 2009, McConnell, 2009). It is assumed, for instance, that incumbents are more likely to offer an exogenous frame when the disaster appears to be the result of natural causes that are beyond the influence of policymakers (Boin et al., 2008). Some disasters make it easier to argue that policymakers and politicians could not have foreseen the crisis, or done anything to prevent it. Timing matters as well (Boin et al., 2008, Ekengren, 2002, Nohrstedt, 2011, Widmaier et al., 2007). It matters when in the political cycle a crisis hits. For instance, if a crisis hits at a time near a sensitive political moment such as an election, we may expect politicians to be more eager to offer reform options. Moreover, long-sitting incumbent leaders are more liable to come under attack than new leaders. Therefore, long-sitting incumbent leaders are thought to be less willing to exploit a crisis while new leaders are more likely to exploit the crisis to consolidate their political power.

Текст 6. After Fukushima: Safety culture and fostering critical thinking

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The main objective of this paper is to draw on the Japanese experience with the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi based on a case study that takes various accident investigation reports as points of departure (Berglund, 2016). This was not an accident that could not have been anticipated. I will develop the results of the study, adding a new perspective. Firstly, safety culture is a complex phenomenon. In my own research on nuclear safety and supplementary training, it has become evident that the skill or

proficiency of operatives and employees is often not appropriately addressed as an essential element in what we may consider a robust safety culture. Safety culture is also linked to critical thinking but not in the way that we have become used to (Berglund, 2016). An awareness of the Fukushima accident places the conception of critical thinking in a different light, as a characteristic of safety-critical activities that is difficult to standardize; the process of applying and evaluating information gathered from observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication to form a judgment (Hughes, 1996, p. 21–25). In recent decades, discussions on safety culture, whether academic or expert-oriented, have moved away from a persistent emphasis on behavior control as a model for individual and organizational learning (cf. Guldenmund, 2010). Today, research on safety culture will derive from a broader range of literature and empiricism, relating not least to the priorities of leadership, or power. In an established praxis, rule-following is consistent with characteristic styles or patterns embedded in practice. We can also assume that there are intrinsic links between various types of knowledge related to professional activities, for instance the knowledge we acquire from everyday experience (knowledge expressed in skill), the knowledge we extract from watching predecessors and exchanging experiences with coworkers (knowledge of familiarity), and the knowledge we attain through written sources and formal education (conceptual knowledge) (Johannessen, 2006). Arguably, they are equally important in the anticipation, detection and management of risk. In other words, important aspects of professional knowledge and its dispersal is "predominantly tacit" (Polanyi, 1983, p. 60). It is reasonable to argue that skills can be transmitted between people, as in the process of internship, training, or education; it may be dialogue-based, but it is not a transfer of knowledge or experience. Skill is both individual and collective, evolving from the experiences, trials, and errors of individuals working together. This also applies to the reflexive processes that nurture its build-up—and when facing challenges of self-reflection through failure or adversity (Göranzon et al., 2006). While researching the background and aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, I searched for significant effects and discussions that these events had given rise to. For instance, I learned more about the uses of small-group improvement activities, or kaizen. In Japan, a variety of arrangements, rituals, and innovations combine work and learning. This could be regarded as a form of supplementary training, though it is voluntary. What is the benefit of kaizen activities over time? First, there is the empowerment and greater involvement of employees, as the success of such activities relies on support from senior management. There is also process improvement and the "nonlinear" learning of adults' proficiency (Berglund, 2016). For example, people seem to extract more knowledge from events or experiences of an adverse character that are likely to be classified as mishaps, than from the routine proceedings of everyday practice. At the heart of what we might characterize as industrialized craftsmanship is a capacity to recognize patterns and detect minor changes in a certain process. Importantly, it involves the ability to act in situations of uncertainty. This form of knowledge "begins with the typical rather that the universal, (going) more rapidly and directly to particular causes"

(Crawford, 2009, p 166). By learning from a variety of situations, professionals are often able to intervene in managing the unexpected. During the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there were courageous interventions from plant personnel. Hence, some investigations have emphasized the merit of skill, or proficiency. Arguably, in a technological culture like Japan, the national education system has increasingly focused on transferring knowledge rather than teaching students how to think. Moreover, for young people there has been a shift in opportunities in recent decades, as part-time or temporary workers have increased from one-fifth to one-third of the labor force, indicating an ongoing decline in highly skilled workers (Berglund, 2016, p. 25–26). Sennett (2008) suggested that the "slow learning" of proficiency is likely to follow a continuous cycle of problem solving and problem finding. In the modern organization, particularly in Taylorized workplaces where alternative or digressive approaches are constrained, this process is unfulfilled. Adverse effects on learning can manifest, for instance, in the hollowing out of ability, or de-skilling, of professionals jumping to hasty conclusions, and in difficulties dealing with reality. In the modern workplace, there are conflicting measures of quality: "one based on correctness, the other on practical experience" (Sennett, 2008, p. 52). As experience is transformed into knowledge, variations in skill (positive or negative) are bound to occur over longer periods. Case studies in the interdisciplinary field of Skill and technology have demonstrated that over a period of 4–5 years, examiners are able to make a better estimation of whether the skill base of organizations progresses or degenerates—a time span the modern organization may not be able to accommodate (cf. Göranzon et al., 2006). In nuclear training, evaluators are often looking to establish immediate effects in terms of learning and knowledge acquisition, preferably by the next day or week. This is a symptom of long-term cultural changes in terms of how professional knowledge is conceived and codified. It represents an outlook on safety culture focused on visible behavior, observables, and short-run indicators (Berglund, 2013). The development of skill represents a more indirect approach to safety. In this process, minor events, trials, and errors reveal themselves as sources of learning and what risk analyst Nassim Taleb defined as antifragility. But in many industries the pursuit of short-term incentives takes a dominant role. Many safety-critical organizations are looking to reduce minor errors and stressors to increase short-term gains and profits—not solely in pursuit of safety. In the long run, we tend to make socio-technological systems fragile, if overprotecting or over-stabilizing them, to make them more predictable through "the systematic removal of variability" (Taleb, 2013, p. 61–62). This is one of the paradoxes scholars with an interest in risk and safety are likely to encounter. Likewise, coordinated learning from mistakes and incidents tends to vary between organizations and sectors. Syed (2015) delineated key links between failure and success by comparing two of the most important safety-critical activities, healthcare and aviation. The striking difference between the two is their divergent attitudes toward failure. While the airline industry has developed a 'black box thinking' by which accidents are analyzed so that procedures can be changed incrementally to avoid similar mistakes in the future, in health and medical care there seems to be less

transparency and a tendency for evasion. According to Syed, this reluctance to get to the bottom of things runs deep in the culture of this sector and contributes to the disclosure of repeated mistakes at the expense of the bigger picture of learning, establishing a culture in which errors are stigmatized. In several cases, investigation committees have even been accused of cover-ups, intended "not to expose lessons, but to conceal them" (ibid. p. 60). In Japan, manufacturing companies like Nissan and Toyota have been effective in turning failure into long-term success. The Toyota Production Model, for example, is based on accepting and analyzing failure and proactively involving staff members in the process of learning and incremental change. It has also become a role model for other sectors of industry globally. Whichever way we look at it, there is more to safety and quality than the assimilation of best practice, such as creating the conditions for a broader scope of knowledge development at various levels of organizational learning. Arguably, it is not so much about transferring methods and procedures as transferring an attitude (ibid. p. 52–64). Minor errors, upsets, and incidents are often benign, reversible, and rich in information on how certain systems behave over time, allowing people to perceive and interpret the "message from reality" (Taleb, 2007). In other words, the removal of variability is not equivalent to the elimination of risk. Regulatory authorities, which insist on increased automation and the use of expensive safety equipment to safeguard against minor hazards, may illustrate the difficulty of matching regulations to the local circumstances of each organization. Overprotection of systems (economic, technological, or natural) tends to generate small gains in the short run but large losses in the longer term in terms of increased vulnerability to the impact of rare events like viruses, tsunamis, or black swans in the financial market (Taleb, 2013). This upsets the underlying processes through which humans learn. However, safety measures ought not to be based only on probability, but also on what is possible. Not unlike aviation, the nuclear community has developed coordinated learning processes among its partner organizations worldwide, for instance, the dissemination of operating experience and international best practice. In high-risk activities, it is international best practice that incidents and deviations from normal procedure are reported to an all-embracing enterprise system, such as the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Promoted by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the idea is that by registering all deviations from normality, the recurrence of error will be prevented, and organizations will share experiences. A safe condition is defined, and through the analysis and trending of incidents, new guidelines and standards are issued. In the decade prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, its owner the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had introduced several measures supporting its organizational safety culture, for instance, implementing a corrective action program. TEPCO had also developed a set of safety culture principles based on WANO best practice, with a broader dissemination of all reported difficulties with safety culture implications. Additional measures included a safety culture performance indicator (cf. INPO, 2012). The facilities were well-organized and had excellent housekeeping and performance records. Yet their training approach was oriented toward the expected rather than worst-case

scenarios. Also, there was a culture of compliance typical of the Japanese, as employees were not encouraged to constructively disagree with superiors (Berglund, 2016, p. 17). Besides, Japanese officials have tended to place the interests of their own organization before issues of public safety: The reason why TEPCO overlooked the significant risk of a tsunami lies within its risk management mind-set – in which the interpretation of issues was often stretched to suit its own agenda. In a sound risk management structure, the management considers and implements countermeasures for risk events that have an undeniable probability, even if details have yet to be scientifically confirmed (Kurokawa et al. 2012, p. 28). Rather than acting on the basis of existing knowledge, the company resorted to delaying tactics and lobbying, in protection of its own interests. Japanese production systems are acclaimed, and Japanese organizations get high marks in international safety reviews, which gives an indication of what estimation measures like these tend to leave out or are not able to influence. Mainly, they are measurements of performance rather than safety. In the case of Fukushima Daiichi, owned by TEPCO, executives and top managers were detached from core activities; they were prioritizing business. During the events of the catastrophe, they made repeated requests to on-site managers that were either unfeasible or not achievable (Berglund, 2016, p. 79). Is this a consequence of the ingrained convention of Japanese society? Is it a reflection of long-term cultural changes of the nuclear industry, toward commercial pressures and extensive formalization? The Swedish nuclear industry has been highly influenced by international benchmarking. Prior to the Fukushima accident, I was researching the training and educational system operated by the Swedish Nuclear Safety and Training Centre (KSU). The background of the study was a generation shift in personnel and technology. This joint development project was set around small-group reflection activities to illuminate key aspects of quality and proficiency in nuclear operations, taking its point of departure from analogies to other fields of practice and from epistemology. These dialogues occurred outside the workplace and claimed to represent the intersubjective knowledge and views between people of various experiences within the same line of work. Due to commercial pressures and enforced standardization, many people involved in this line of work were tangled up in a position that was difficult to see a way out of; they were increasingly subject to short-run incentives where worksheets and standard procedures had become the answer to everything. In supplementary training, the urge to establish an immediate impact was accentuated, indicating a move toward a "transfer of knowledge"-type training and educational system. Besides, following the incident at the Forsmark nuclear station in 2006, there were concerns about the priorities of upper management, as investigators claiming it lacked a long-term commitment to safety (Berglund, 2016, p. 47–49). We can thus divide trade-offs between safety and productivity into subcategories. For instance, operatives and coworkers might perceive expectations from managers that productivity has priority over safety. The operatives themselves may consider continuity of production the highest priority. In some cases, there can also be practical obstacles to prioritizing safety over productivity (Nordlöf et al. 2015, p. 130). In the long term, this could have a devastating effect. We

know that there were irregularities about the choice of location on the eastern coastline and the assembly of the protective seawalls intended to shield against typhoons. When constructing the facility in the late 1960s, a 35-m natural seawall was reduced to about 10 m. Given current information at the time, this was adequate, and it made the building process much easier. A few years prior to the Fukushima accident, a seismology professor and member of a nuclear safety board resigned in protest due to lack of responsiveness to earthquake and tsunami risks. New safety tests had led experts to suggest the construction of a new seawall, but a former executive wrote it off. When the Great East Japan Earthquake and the following 15-m tsunami struck in March 2011, the area was flooded, as the remaining seawall also prevented large amounts of water from returning to sea. The cooling systems were disabled, and the supply from backup batteries was not enough to sustain all six reactors, causing the meltdown of three reactors. Large amounts of radioactive material were emitted into the Pacific and the surrounding area, and more than 150,000 people were evacuated. In these conditions, operatives showed great ingenuity in their efforts to restore critical safety functions, preventing the accident from worsening (cf. INPO, 2012, p. 30–34; Perrow, 2011a).  In safety-critical activities, there are potential sources of degeneration. Market competition, for instance, usually creates a short-term incentive for profits. And whereas many power companies have been looking to improve efficiency, others have cut operating costs by reducing maintenance costs or other outlays, one example being the Millstone nuclear facility in Connecticut. Despite the awareness among executives and top managers of the risks of making deep cuts in maintenance costs, it was only later that the long-term consequences became evident, after whistleblowers had been fired or mistreated for reporting safety violations. After discovering further problems, in 1996 the (NRC) had no choice but to shut down all three of the Millstone power plants until considerable measures were taken (Perrow, 2011b, p. 156–164). A subsequent case is the event at the Ohio David-Besse plant in 2002, where safety culture was explicitly identified as the root cause of the incident. In this case, there was an aging problem with the reactors aggravated by corrosion over several years, creating a hole in the top of the reactor vessel. There were other issues as well, but none were addressed by the facility or the owner. Once again, whistleblowers were fired and even sued for reporting these problems. Worse yet, the NRC had examined the facility and was contacted by whistleblowers but failed to take action. When a similar case was discovered at another power station, a compromise was struck, allowing the plant to run for a few more months. Once a complete investigation was made, the NRC blamed David-Besse for lacking a safety culture. Yet despite signs of a cover-up, the agency was reluctant to make a full disclosure (ibid. p. 145–153). Arguably, both nuclear stations came close to a major disaster. If this could happen in the Nuclear Power Industry and in countries like the U.S., it is relevant to any high-risk organization. According to sociologist Charles Perrow, these events were caused by executive and management failures rather than the failures of workers or operatives, even if it is sometimes difficult to make the distinction. In the long-term build-up to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi there were several

incidents of a similar kind at nuclear plants run by TEPCO: In 2001, a whistle-blower triggered disclosure of falsified tests at some of the company's seventeen plants, and the government forced TEPCO to close some plants. In 2002, the company predicted that all of its seventeen plants might have to shut down for inspection and repairs, because of falsified inspections and concealment of faults found in inspections that the government ordered; some of the faults were potentially catastrophic. A top company official was charged with giving specific orders to hide large cracks in the "shrouds", or the steel casings around the reactor core, in two of the thirteen reactors at which false reports had been filed (ibid. p 143). In high-risk activities, we might consider reporting design flaws or other malfeasances part of everyday practice, while supervisory authorities and international organizations take a supportive role. Nonetheless, as can be extracted from the Japanese experience, we must not take dialogue and critical thinking for granted. According to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Committee (NAIIC), in Japan nuclear power became immune to scrutiny by civil society. Basically, its regulation was in the hands of "the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion" (Kurokawa et al., 2012, p. 9). Also, there was competition between energy sources. This mindset prevented Japan's nuclear industry from absorbing critical lessons learned from accidents in other areas of the world, and it arguably overcame whistleblowers. According to this inquiry, it had become established practice "to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents" (ibid. p. 9). On the whole, a lack of critical thinking together with the "groupism" of Japanese society was highlighted as decisive factors in the Fukushima accident investigation in terms of complacency. When it comes to safety, the Japanese would have demanded risk zero, the notion that nothing can go wrong. The goal is to create systems that are faultless or near perfect. Essentially, this reluctance to acknowledge uncertainty is a safety culture problem throughout Japan. On the other hand, we might categorize the Fukushima Daiichi accident as a "black elephant" rather than black swan: a high-impact event beyond our regular expectations where potential dangers were known but largely ignored or improperly addressed. In this case, seismologists had warned of the potential consequences of large-scale earthquakes and tsunami waves to nuclear plants along the east coast of Japan: This is a general problem for all industry, but it may be especially troublesome for any large-scale energy infrastructure, such as nuclear power, hydropower dams and the production of fossil fuels [...]. An active and open public discussion provides a basic protection against black elephants, and the urge to suppress it is a serious long-term impingement (Möller and Wikman-Svahn, 2011, p. 274–275). In most societies and organizations, there are various levels of self-censorship. We might be persuaded to agree on conclusions or truths we might not otherwise accept. Compliance indicates an adaptation to the group while privately disagreeing. Complacency, however, points toward a rather false sense of contentment with our own abilities or situation. Fostering critical thinking among professionals is crucial to the detection and analysis of second-order consequences, where there is a need for a broader scope of anticipation and evaluation of risk. Accidents can clear our views, making us see things that have

previously gone unnoticed. The fact that critical voices are not heard or have no impact is not uncommon. There are cultural perceptions of risk established by assessments of physical or scientific evidence, the biases of which international organizations like WANO, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are looking to counterbalance. However, most organizations produce their own view of reality—and self-interests. They are themselves arenas for conflicting interests, and safety issues are often subject to disagreement (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, Antonsen, 2009). "Whistleblowers" usually refer to people who expose some sort of illicit or unethical activities within a private or public organization, bringing information of alleged wrongdoing into the public eye. There are several well-known cases of this kind of exposure in recent decades, a few of them linked to international organizations like WikiLeaks. Whistleblowing could be internal or external, anonymous or public, illegal or legitimate. Whether it is an employee or an outside consultant that suspects irregularities that he or she then brings to the media, the informant quite often pays a price. Occasionally, the whistleblower remains anonymous, and disclosure is made through an external party. Arguably, the most substantial aspect of whistleblowing is its effects: is it an act rather than a function that may be defused if "institutionalized"? The question of whether whistleblowers owe loyalty to their organization or to society is arguably overstated. Its outcome can benefit coworkers as much as society (Andrade, 2015, p. 322f.). Whistleblowing is often associated with courageous individuals, but the effort of detecting and uncovering malfeasance with the intention of avoiding future accidents may well be collective. In some industries, for example, labor unions occasionally serve as institutionalized whistleblowers (Antonsen, 2009, p. 190). Due to commercial pressures, competition, insularity, and a lack of integrity in the relationship between regulatory authorities and energy utilities, critical voices seem to have had a limited impact. For the most part, regulatory authorities failed in their role as 'critics': The Fukushima Daiichi accident has highlighted the role of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the pursuit of safety and quality, which has lifted the assumption that authorities also need scrutiny. Is there an open discussion? Are we targeting the right issues? Are we exerting the right kind of pressure? Organizations like WANO have become aware of the implications of national culture while more closely examining the priorities of management regarding its commitment to safety.

Текст 7.   Should we expect differences between men and women?

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753519321939

This article analyses gender differences in occupational accidents from three research areas in which differences have been found: occupational stress, personality and driving patterns. Specifically, it uses the

Job Demand-Control Model (JDC) and adds neuroticism and conscientiousness as personality variables related to accidents. Survey data were collected using an anonymous questionnaire, and the sample consisted of 652 workers (52.5% men, with an average of 38.1 years of age, *S.D.* = 10.7). Hierarchical linear regression was employed to prove the relationships (direct and interaction effects) to predict the number of accidents (occupational accidents and incidents and commuting accidents). To identify gender influences, separate analyses were undertaken for female and male workers. The results demonstrate that demands and control, measured with the Job Content Questionnaire, are not related to accidents, although they are related to working hours, kms to work and job position. With regard to personality variables, neuroticism modulates the effect of job control, but only among women. Conscientiousness is also directly related to accidents and modulates the effect of job demands and job control, with differences between men and women. These results indicate three-way interactions (stressors × personality × gender), so far unexplored, but which coincide with research in other areas and reinforce the importance of developing a gender perspective in the study of occupational accidents. Karasek's job demand-control model (1979) is one of the most cited models in the study of job stress as different meta-analyses show. This model considers two psychosocial factors as major determinants of work stress, job demands (JD) and job demands (JC). JD refers to physical, social or organizational aspects of a job that require sustained physical and psychological effort. However, JC refers to an individual's autonomy level to decide what, how and when to do his or her work. Both of these variables can affect stress and health directly, but JC also plays a moderating role in the association between JD and stress, such that employees with higher JC are less likely to be stressed out when facing higher demands (Häusser et al., 2010). Although some research has found that JD and JC can affect different job-related outcomes, less research has been conducted on the influence of high demands and lack of control regarding occupational accidents (Heo et al., 2015, Useche et al., 2018), even though both excessive demands (Galizzi, 2013) and the absence of control (Tucker et al., 2016) have been proven to be related to occupational accidents. Three of the four recent meta-analyses on the JDC model indicate the importance of considering the gender of the samples. Luchman and González-Morales (2013) note that the demand–control relationship showed that mainly female samples obtained negative correlations, whereas mainly male samples obtained positive correlations, so a continuation into the study of the role of gender is recommended. The next meta-analysis also shows gender differences. Females perceiving their work to be highly demanding appraise demand stressors as more distressing than men do and also perceive less control over their work than men (File et al., 2017). But the only meta-analysis that reviewed the effects psychosocial work factors on physical health found, in an important part of the studies, a significant adverse effect among men (Gilbert-Ouimet et al., 2014), and this effect is ever more consistent in studies of higher methodological quality. Recently, a study with a Canadian representative population examined the relationship between psychological work exposures and work stress and also recommended identifying

the differences between men and women (Padkapayeva et al., 2018). **H1** According to the strain hypothesis, higher JD and lower JC (H1a and H1b respectively) increase the probability of accidents (occupational accidents and incidents and commuting accidents). **H2** According to the buffer hypotheses of the JDC model (H1c) when JC is high it can reduce the negative effect of JD on the probability of accidents (occupational accidents and incidents and commuting accidents). Separate analyses for male and female workers have been carried out to explore possible differences with regard to gender, since results on other dependent variables point in this direction. 1.2. Personality, work stress, accidents and gender. Few studies on Karasek's JDC model have incorporated personality variables, but traits are related to how employees perceive and react to work stress. The review of Györkös et al. (2012) analyzed the impact of personality on the JDC model. They gathered evidence that neuroticism is linked to more exposure to stress and to more physical and emotional reactivity toward stress, which, in turn, has a negative impact on well-being and health. In addition, conscientiousness is considered a protective factor given its consistently negative association with perceived work stress and its positive link with functional coping strategies. Törnroos et al. (2013) also found associations between personality traits and, specifically, that high levels of neuroticism were related to high demands, low control and high job strain and low levels of conscientiousness were related to low control and high job strain. Although the meta-analytic study of Salgado (2002) did not find that personality factors were good predictors of accident rates, later meta-analyses using the big five personality model (McCrae and Costa, 1987) found other interesting results. People who score high in neuroticism can be characterized as nervous and worrying and who tend to be impulsive and experience more distress than others (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism increases people's perception of job stressors as being worse, which, in turn, has a negative impact on well-being and health. In addition, people who score high in conscientiousness generally understand and follow guidelines, particularly safety guidelines, which reduces the probability of accidents (Hogan and Foster, 2013). Two meta-analytical studies confirm the relationships among these two variables of personality and accidents (Beus et al., 2015, Fyhri and Backer-Grøndahl, 2012). More recently, Rau et al. (2018) in a sample of elevator workers found that trait anxiety and conscientiousness could predict occupational accidents. Taken together, these results substantiate the value of considering personality as a key correlate of occupational accidents (see Fig. 1). **H3** High scores for neuroticism are related, directly and positively, to the probability of accidents (occupational accidents and incidents and commuting accidents) (H3a) and indirectly by increasing the effect of high JD and the absence of JC (H3b). Explained above, one can observe that, in most cases, the relationships are different for men and women. **H4** High scores for conscientiousness are related, directly and negatively, to the probability of accidents (occupational accidents and incidents and commuting accidents) (H4a) and indirectly by reducing the effect of high JD and the absence of JC (H4b). In addition, we also expect these relationships to be different depending on gender and we therefore explore these relationships in men and women.

Despite not having found previous studies of a similar nature, the research conducted in other areas support our aim in analyzing these differences. Grav et al. (2012), using a sample of 35,832 men and women, examined the relationship between personality and mental health and observed that high scores in neuroticism are worse for men than for women. Also Allen et al. (2016), using a national representative sample, found neuroticism had a greater impact on men's physical health. Some studies have tried to explain these differences. For example, Axfors et al. (2018) found that neuroticism has a positive effect on women's health because this variable is related to a higher usage of health services. Nevertheless, other studies did not find more positive consequences for women (e.g. Vassend et al., 2018). In relation to conscientiousness, Kim et al. (2016) found that female gender was associated with higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness, which were related to higher levels of stress, and this could in turn lead to greater depressive symptoms. Research on road traffic accidents also highlight the gender differences attributable to differences in unsafe behaviours (Herrero-Fernández et al., 2016), distractions (Johansson and Fyhri, 2017) or aggressive behaviour (Berdoulat et al., 2013). In addition, some studies consider gender as a noteworthy variable when analysing occupational commuting accidents (Fort et al., 2016), although most studies on the topic consider gender only as a control variable (e.g. Fyhri and Backer-Grøndahl, 2012). It is for this reason that we find it important to undertake differentiated analyses, which entails the testing of three-way interactions. Given the aforementioned precedents, the present study analyses gender differences in the association between the JDC model components, personality and occupational accidents, which, to our knowledge, has never been tested before. In addition, other control variables also related to accidents, such as age (Herrero-Fernández and Fonseca-Baeza, 2017, Shen et al., 2018), experience (Jankovský et al., 2019) or working hours were considered (Giliberti and Salerno, 2016). The sample was selected using the incidental method, and participation in this study was voluntary. The data collection took place in 2018 throughout the Spanish territory via an online questionnaire. The selection criteria were paid employment and daily driving to the workplace. Before commencing the test, the instructions were presented to the participants and information confidentiality was guaranteed. Around 10% of the questionnaires were eliminated due to errors in the completion of the forms. The sample was composed of 652 workers, of which 52.5% were men. The average age was of 38.1 years (S.D. = 10.7). Their job position was evaluated in 5 levels, as follows: 8.3% were low-low level for unskilled jobs -labourer- (level 1 of the variable); 23.5% low-medium level -shop assistants, waiters- (level 2); 36.9% medium level for technicians without a university degree -plumber, electrician- (level 3); 25.9% medium-high level for trained professionals with an university degree–school teachers, social workers- (level 4) and 3.2% high-high level for professionals with an university master degree–doctors, professors- (level 5). The control variables were job position, kilometers covered from their homes to their workplace and daily working hours within the organization and at home. All these were measured as one sole item. JD and JC were evaluated with the two subscales set by the Job Content

Questionnaire by Karasek et al. (1998), as adapted to our country by the research team. JD subscale had seven items (e.g. "I have to perform my work tasks quickly"), and JC subscale had a further seven items (e.g. "I can choose how to do my job"). These items were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (always). The reliability of the JD scale is $\alpha = 0.74$ for the male group and $\alpha = 0.72$ for the female group. The reliability of the JC scale is $\alpha = 0.84$ for men and $\alpha = 0.82$ for women. Neuroticism and Conscientiousness were evaluated with three items each selected from the Big Five Questionnaire by Costa and McCrae (1999) (e.g. Neuroticism: "I easily lose my calm"; Conscientiousness: "I do my work attentively and without distraction"). In all three cases the response scale was of the Likert type, and it spanned from 0 (never) to 4 (always). The reliability of the neuroticism scale for men is 0.76 and for women 0.73; that of conscientiousness is 0.73 for men and 0.76 for women. Occupational accidents were measured with one only item: "How many accidents have you suffered at work within the last three years?", as suggested by Sümer (2003). In accordance, commuting accidents were also evaluated with only one item: "How many accidents have you suffered during your journeys to and from work as a driver within the last three years?". Also, occupational incidents were measured with one only item, but regarding the last three months, since Chapman and Underwood (2000) recommend measuring shorter timescales, given that, as they are less significant events, they are less easily remembered: "Within the last three months, how many incidents (i.e. an incident that could have resulted in an injury but did not) have you suffered in your journeys to and from work?)". To prove whether significant differences exist between men and women in these variables, t-tests were undertaken (Table 1), which prove differences in five variables: men work longer hours in their organization ($t = 25.19$; $p < .001$), but women work longer hours at home ($t = 40.40$; $p < .001$). Men commute longer distances to work ($t = 4.17$; $p < .05$) and occupy positions of higher job level than women ($t = 4.86$; $p < .05$). Regarding neuroticism, women present higher scores than men ($t = 16.29$; $p < .001$). Table 1 presents these results, alongside the correlations between variables. As eIn Table 1, one can observe that the control variables show some relationships in line with the gender differences analyzed. In men working hours or working hours at home are not related to accidents. In the case of women, the longer the working hours the more incidents ($r = 0.12$; $p < .05$) and the longer the working hours at home, the more occupational accidents ($r = 0.29$; $p < .001$). In addition, the job position is negatively related to incidents ($r = -0.21$; $p < .01$), but only in the male group. Kms to work are positively related to commuting accidents in men ($r = 0.16$, $p < .01$) and in women ($r = 0.17$, $p < .01$), also in the case of men these are related to incidents ($r = 0.13$; $p < .05$). The correlations also demonstrate that neither demands nor control are related to accidents, with one exception: in the male group, the more JD the more commuting accidents ($r = 0.24$; $p < .001$). Personality variables also show different correlations for men and women. In the male group, neuroticism is not related to any of the three accidentality measures, but in the female group it is negatively related to incidents. Conscientiousness is related to incidents in men ($r = -0.15$; $p < .01$) and to occupational

accidents in women ($r = -0.13$; $p < .01$) and, in both groups, with commuting accidents (men: $r = -0.18$, $p < .001$; women: $r = -0.11$, $p < .05$). The hierarchical regression analysis was employed to examine the direct and modulated relations proposed in the hypothesis. In line with Hair et al. (1998) the multivariate analysis showed the extent to which an independent variable explained the variance of a dependent variable after taking into account other independent variables. Moderated multiple regression was the main statistical technique used in this study. To test for interaction terms, we developed a hierarchical regression analysis in which the independent variables were entered in a predetermined sequence so that 'terms of lower order are partialled from those of higher order and not vice versa' (Cohen, 1978). Interaction terms were entered after main effects (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). Since tolerance indexes in all the cases are higher than 0.65, multicollinearity should not be considered to be a problem. At the first step of the analysis, working hours, hours home, Kms to work and job level, were entered in order to control their impact. Following similar works that analyze Karasek's model (Karasek and Theorell, 1990) and personality variables (e.g. Rodriguez et al., 2001) at the second step, demands (Hip. 1a), control (Hip. 1b) and personality (neuroticism, Hip. 3a and conscientiousness, Hip. 4a) variables were added to test whether they showed significant main effects. In addition, to test the modulated hypotheses (Hip. H2, H3b and H4b), interaction effects were evaluated at the third step of analysis. As one can observe in Table 2, neither the job level variable nor that of neuroticism significantly increase the variance explained by the control variables. This does not confirm the direct relationships proposed in H1 and H3a, although one can observe two modulated relationships in the female group (H3b).

Текст 8. Chances of a Major Conflict

https://www.people-press.org/2018/01/15/majority-of-u-s-public

By a narrow 48% to 43% margin, Americans view the U.S. airstrike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani as the right decision. However, a majority (54%) says the Trump administration's approach toward Iran has increased the likelihood of a major military conflict between the United States and Iran. Just 17% say the administration's approach has decreased chances for a major conflict with Iran, while 26% say it has not made much difference. In assessing the impact of the administration's policies on U.S. security, 44% say its approach has made the U.S. less safe, while a larger share says either it has made the U.S. safer (28%) or has not made much difference (26%). The latest national survey by Pew Research Center, conducted Jan. 8-13 on cell phones and landlines among 1,504 adults, finds that only about a quarter of Americans (23%) say they have a great deal of trust in what the Trump administration says on Iran, while another 22% say they trust the administration a fair amount. A 53% majority say they have not

too much trust (18%) or no trust at all (35%) in the administration's statements on Iran. These views are not substantially different from previous evaluations of President Donald Trump's personal credibility. For example,  a year ago, 58% of the public said they trusted what Trump says less than what previous presidents said; just 26% said they trusted his statements more than those of his predecessors, while 14% said they trusted his statements about the same as past presidents. virtually all of Trump's policies and decisions – and Trump himself – opinions about the U.S. airstrike against Iran and its impact are divided along partisan lines. However, while Republicans overwhelmingly support the decision to conduct the airstrike, they express more mixed views of how Trump's approach toward Iran has affected prospects for war with Iran and U.S. security. By contrast, Democrats largely express negative views of the impact of the airstrike on both the likelihood for conflict with Iran and on U.S. security. Only about a third of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (34%) say the administration's approach toward Iran has decreased the likelihood of a major military clash with Iran; 26% say it has increased likelihood of such a conflict, and 37% say it has not made much difference. A sizable majority of Democrats (81%) say the administration's approach toward Iran has increased the likelihood of a major military conflict between the U.S. and Iran. While 56% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say Trump's approach toward Iran has made the U.S. safer, a much larger majority of Democrats and Democratic leaners (75%) say it has made the U.S. less safe. However, Republicans and Republican leaners have rallied behind the decision to conduct the airstrike: 84% say it was the right decision, while 11% say it was the wrong decision. Democrats view the decision to conduct the airstrike as wrong, but by a less substantial margin (73% to 17%). Notably, among the roughly one-quarter of Republicans who say the Trump administration's approach to Iran has raised chances of a military conflict, most (65%) say the decision to conduct the airstrike was the right one. Only about a third of Republicans (31%) who say Trump's approach has raised the likelihood of a military conflict with Iran say it was the wrong decision. Women, young adults are especially likely to say Trump's approach toward Iran could lead to major military conflict with Iran. There are sizable age and gender differences in views of the U.S. airstrike. Women are nearly 20 percentage points less likely than men to say the decision to conduct the airstrike was the right one (37% vs. 58%). And adults under 30 are the only age group in which significantly more view the airstrike as wrong (51%) than right (40%). These differences extend to views of the Trump administration's overall approach toward Iran. A majority of women (62%) say the administration's approach to Iran has increased the likelihood of a major military conflict; about half of men (47%) say the same. While majorities of adults ages 18 to 29 (65%) and 30 to 49 (61%) say the administration's approach has raised the likelihood of a major conflict with Iran, a smaller share of those ages 50 and older (46%) express this view. Few Americans have great deal of trust in what Trump administration says about the situation in Iran. Overall, more Americans say they have little or no trust in what the Trump administration says about the situation in Iran (53%) than say they have a great deal or fair

amount of trust (45%) in the administration's statements. Republicans and Republican-leaning independents express much greater trust than Democrats and Democratic leaners in the Trump administration's statements on Iran. But there are wide differences in trust in the administration between those who identify as Republicans and those who lean toward the Republican Party. Among Republican identifiers, 57% have a great deal of trust in what the administration says on Iran; among Republican-leaning independents, who constitute about a third of Republicans and Republican leaners, just 33% have a great deal of trust in the administration's statements on Iran. Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents both are largely distrustful of the administration's statements on Iran; comparable majorities of each (62% and 57%, respectively) say they have no trust at all in what the administration says about the situation in Iran. Among independents overall, including those who do not lean toward either party, 60% say they have little or no trust in what the Trump administration says about Iran, including 36% who have no trust in their statements. Nearly four-in-ten (38%) have at least a fair amount of trust in the administration's statements on the situation in Iran.

**Текст 9.** Key findings about Americans' confidence in science

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/12/key-findings-about-americans-confidence-

Science issues – whether connected with climate, childhood vaccines or new techniques in biotechnology – are part of the fabric of civic life, raising a range of social, ethical and policy issues for the citizenry. As members of the scientific community gather at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) this week, here is a roundup of key takeaways from our studies of U.S. public opinion about science issues and their effect on society. If you're on Twitter, follow @pewscience for more science findings. Some public divides over science issues are aligned with partisanship, while many others are not. Science issues can be a key battleground for facts and information in society. Climate science has been part of an ongoing discourse around scientific evidence, how to attribute average temperature increases in the Earth's climate system, and the kinds of policy actions needed. While public divides over climate and energy issues are often aligned with political party affiliation, public attitudes on other science-related issues are not. For example, there are differences in public beliefs around the risks and benefits of childhood vaccines. Such differences arise amid civic debates about the spread of false information about vaccines. While such beliefs have important implications for public health, they are not particularly political in nature. In fact, Republicans and independents who lean to the GOP are just as likely as Democrats and independents who lean to the Democratic Party to say that, overall, the benefits of the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine outweigh the risks (89% and 88% respectively). Americans have differing views about some emerging scientific and technological

developments. Scientific and technological developments are a key source of innovation and, therefore, change in society. Pew Research Center studies have explored public reactions to emergent developments from genetic engineering techniques, automation and more. One field at the forefront of public reaction is the use of gene editing of babies or genetic engineering of animals. Americans have mixed views over whether the use of gene editing to reduce a baby's risk of serious disease that could occur over their lifetime is appropriate (60%) or is taking medical technology too far (38%), according to a 2018 survey. Similarly, about six-in-ten Americans (57%) said that genetic engineering of animals to grow organs or tissues for humans needing a transplant would be appropriate, while four-in-ten (41%) said it would be taking technology too far. When we asked Americans about a future where a brain chip implant would give otherwise healthy individuals much improved cognitive abilities, a 69% majority said they were very or somewhat worried about the possibility. By contrast, about half as many (34%) were enthusiastic. Further, as people think about the effects of automation technologies in the workplace, more say automation has brought more harm than help to American workers. One theme running through our findings on emerging science and technology is that public hesitancy often is tied to concern about the loss of human control, especially if such developments would be at odds with personal, religious and ethical values. In looking across seven developments related to automation and the potential use of biomedical interventions to "enhance" human abilities, Center studies found that proposals that would increase peoples' control over these technologies were met with greater acceptance. **from science for society, and they expect more ahead.** About three-quarters of Americans (73%) say science has, on balance, had a mostly positive effect on society. And 82% expect future scientific developments to yield benefits for society in years to come. The overall portrait is one of strong public support for the benefits of science to society, though the degree to which Americans embrace this idea differs sizably by race and ethnicity as well as by levels of science knowledge. Such findings are in line with those of the General Social Survey on the effects of scientific research. In 2018, about three-quarters of Americans (74%) said the benefits of scientific research outweigh any harmful results. Support for scientific research by this measure has been roughly stable since the 1980s. **The share of Americans with confidence in scientists to act in the public interest has increased since 2016.** Public confidence in scientists to act in the public interest tilts positive and has increased over the past few years. As of 2019, 35% of Americans report a great deal of confidence in scientists to act in the public interest, up from 21% in 2016. About half of the public (51%) reports a "fair amount" of confidence in scientists, and just 13% have not too much or no confidence in this group to act in the public interest. Public trust in scientists by this measure stands in contrast to that for other groups and institutions. One of the hallmarks of the current times has been low trust in government and other institutions. One-in-ten or fewer say they have a great deal of confidence in elected officials (4%) or the news media (9%) to act in the public interest. **Americans differ over the role and value of scientific experts in policy matters.** While confidence in scientists overall tilts

positive, people's perspectives about the role and value of scientific experts on policy issues tends to vary. Six-in-ten U.S. adults believe that scientists should take an active role in policy debates about scientific issues, while about four-in-ten (39%) say, instead, that scientists should focus on establishing sound scientific facts and stay out of such debates. Democrats are more inclined than Republicans to think scientists should have an active role in science policy matters. Indeed, most Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (73%) hold this position, compared with 43% of Republicans and GOP leaners. More than four-in-ten U.S. adults (45%) say that scientific experts usually make better policy decisions than other people, while a similar share (48%) says such decisions are neither better nor worse than other people's and 7% say scientific experts' decisions are usually worse than other people's. Here, too, Democrats tend to hold scientific experts in higher esteem than do Republicans: 54% of Democrats say scientists' policy decisions are usually better than those of other people, while two-thirds of Republicans (66%) say that scientists' decisions are either no different from or worse than other people's. **Factual knowledge alone does not explain public confidence in the scientific method to produce sound conclusions.** Overall, a 63% majority of Americans say the scientific method generally produces sound conclusions, while 35% think it can be used to produce "any result a researcher wants." People's level of knowledge can influence beliefs about these matters, but it does so through the lens of partisanship, a tendency known as motivated reasoning. Beliefs about this matter illustrate that science knowledge levels sometimes correlate with public attitudes. But partisanship has a stronger role. Democrats are more likely to express confidence in the scientific method to produce accurate conclusions than do Republicans, on average. Most Democrats with high levels of science knowledge (86%, based on an 11-item index of factual knowledge questions) say the scientific method generally produces accurate conclusions. By comparison, 52% of Democrats with low science knowledge say this. But science knowledge has little bearing on Republicans' beliefs about the scientific method. **Trust in practitioners like medical doctors and dietitians is stronger than that for researchers in these fields, but skepticism about scientific integrity is widespread.** Scientists work in a wide array of fields and specialties. A 2018 survey found public trust in medical doctors and dietitians to be higher than that for researchers working in these areas. For example, 48% of U.S. adults say that medical doctors give fair and accurate information all or most of the time. By comparison, 32% of U.S. adults say the same about medical research scientists. And six-in-ten Americans say dietitians care about their patients' best interests all or most of the time, while about half as many (29%) say this about nutrition research scientists with the same frequency. One factor in public trust of scientists is familiarity with their work. For example, people who were more familiar with what medical science researchers do were more trusting of these researchers to express care or concern for the public interest, to do their job with competence and to provide fair and accurate information. Familiarity with the work of scientists was related to trust for all six specialties we studied. But when it comes to questions of scientists'

transparency and accountability, most Americans are skeptical. About two-in-ten or fewer U.S. adults say that scientists are transparent about potential conflicts of interest with industry groups all or most of the time. Similar shares (roughly between one-in-ten and two-in-ten) say that scientists admit their mistakes and take responsibility for them all or most of the time. This data shows clearly that when it comes to questions of transparency and accountability, most in the general public are attuned to the potential for self-serving interests to skew science findings and recommendations. These findings echo calls for increased transparency and accountability across many sectors and industries today. **What boosts public trust in scientific research findings? Most say it's making data openly available.** A 57% majority of Americans say they trust scientific research findings more when the data is openly available to the public. And about half of the U.S. public (52%) say they are more likely to trust research that has been independently reviewed. The question of who funds the research is also consequential for how people think about scientific research. A 58% majority say they have lower trust when research is funded by an industry group. By comparison, about half of Americans (48%) say government funding for research has *no particular effect* on how much they trust the findings; 28% say this decreases their trust and 23% say it increases their trust.

**Текст 10.** Belonging in a New Home

http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1564/belonging-in-a-new-home

Anyone paying attention to the 2016 U.S. presidential election undoubtedly noticed intensified rhetoric charged at the country's Latin American population, indicating, for some, a potential regression into visceral and inflamed racial and ethnic relations (Milligan 2016). In fact, some reports indicate that members of the U.S. Latino population have been targeted specifically for their ethnicity, with their attackers citing Donald Trump's views on immigration as motivation (Berman 2015). According to the *Boston Globe*, one of the attackers told police, "Donald Trump was right, all these illegals need to be deported" (Ibid). Moreover, such violence does not represent an isolated incident; America's Voice—an immigration reform advocacy group— has mapped "documented instances where Donald Trump, his supporters, or his staff harassed or attacked Latinos and immigrants" across the country (America's Voice 2016). Representations of Latin Americans as illegal immigrants, job-stealers, and so on thus permeate into popular discourse, likely leading to disastrous effects on their human rights. But how are Latin Americans portrayed in other societal contexts? Considering that socially constructed identities consist of multiple, layered discourses, we should remain skeptical that the above popular representation necessarily characterizes the dominant U.S. discourse on Latin American identity. Indeed, it is unclear if the popular discourse simply receives disproportionate representation relative to other discourses' share of the total

U.S. political debate. For example, how do dominant U.S. media discourses represent Latin Americans? Scholars have shown awareness of media's role in (re) producing the language, symbols, meanings, concepts, knowledge, and so on of a particular discourse in addition to (re)producing the language, symbols, meanings, concepts, knowledge, and so on developed within media discourses themselves (O'Keefe 2011). I seek to investigate discursive representations of Latin Americans within the seven most widely circulated U.S. newspapers in 2015 through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA). I further adopt CDA with the assumption that it can employ a mixed-methods analysis, bridging the traditional dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research (Wetherell, Taylor, and Yates 2011, 10). Ultimately, I argue that dominant U.S. media discourses present a two-tiered image of Latin Americans. On one level, Latin Americans are portrayed overwhelmingly positively, particularly in regard to hard work. On a second level, however, these surface-level positives obscure deeper, tokenizing, paternalistic, and victimizing themes that other Latin Americans and endanger their political agency. Two significant schools of thought attempt to address the question of Latin American immigration and integration: one discursive and one institutional. Although innumerable approaches to migration questions exist, from economics to national security and beyond, both schools of thought do so in terms of human rights. This paper similarly adopts a human rights-based approach, interpreting the primary purpose of migration and migration law as the protection of the rights of migrants, not vague notions of national security or economics. The theoretical inviolability of human rights thus renders such former concerns largely inapposite for all present intents and purposes. The discursive school of thought attempts to advance theoretical claims about how different societal actors use language to give meaning to different ethnicities in society, thus attempting to "reveal racism" in myriad different discursive regimes (Herzog et al. 2009). Scholars in this school of thought propose that nativist discourses marginalize Latin American immigrants by constructing their identities as an intrinsically different "other" to the national "self" (Otazu 2002, Marshall 2007, van Dijk 2005). For example, Herzog et al. (2009) claim that Spanish nativist discourses use drug and alcohol consumption as a scapegoat for ethnic discrimination, casting all or most Latin American immigrants in the same light. According to Herzog et al. (2009), this discursive othering results in less successful integration on the part of the othered community—in this case, Latin American immigrants. Not all of these assumed differences are inherently negative, however. According to Fernández-Lasquetty (2010, 58), problems confronting immigrants do not comprise "reception, idiomatic difficulties, or adapting to the [the host country's] way of life" so much as they comprise the same concerns as natives, such as unemployment and local politics. Discourse analysts challenge these assumptions and ultimately claim that nativist discourses that assume immigrants to possess inherent or irreconcilable differences from native populations lead to racism and marginalization. Most discourse analysts assume that the rhetorical and discursive othering they interrogate translates into material oppression for othered communities. It is, however, unclear whether or not oppressive discourses translate

into "realworld" discrimination. Certainly discourse analysis can reveal prejudices, but to claim that it reveals racism in terms of a systemic, collective, and ongoing cycle of oppression may exceed what available evidence concedes. Furthermore, that discourse analysts have largely focused exclusively on nativist discourses contradicts their own central tenet—leaving an oppressed community's voice out of a conversation about that community's experience is itself a form of metaoppression. This study does not index Latin Americans self-construction of identity, but it interrogates the social construction of Latin American identity by popular print media sources and assumes that media discourses factor into identity construction as only one layer of a multi-layered discursive regime. Institutionalists, by contrast, explicate Latin American marginalization in terms of the tensions and contradictions within official government policy (Ivan 2009). On the one hand, for example, Latin American immigration in Spain is unsurprising because of close "linguistic and cultural-colonial ties" (Calavita, Garzón, and Cachón 2006, 191). Yet, on the other hand, institutionalists claim that Spanish law itself "produced [irregular migration]" by criminalizing some forms of immigration but not others, thus resulting in fear and lack of integration due to the threat of deportation and other penal factors for migrants (Ibid). Some institutionalist scholars propose a "feed-back" model of immigration, whereby local populations' interactions with immigrant populations and their perceptions of immigrants from mass media and political discourse influence their interactions with immigrants in a certain way (Solé et al. 2000, 133-134). If an "attitude of rejection" presides among the local population, then it can "promote labor and economic exclusion" and "legitimize the institutional mechanisms of discrimination themselves" (Ibid, 135). In other words, immigrants' lack of integration into the host country's society reinforces negative stereotypes of immigrant populations, thereby furthering the notion of immigrants' intrinsic differences compared to native populations. The principal criticism of institutionalism is that it overemphasizes the relevance of top-down structures (Herrigel 2005). In fact, precisely because institutions consist of people and depend on them to construct their rules, values, and norms, the discrimination that results from any institution ultimately results from the social construction of institutions in the first place. Institutions dealing with migration are no different; that the Spanish law "produced [irregular migration]" where none such existed previously means that the type of migration subsequently classified as irregular could not have been so were it not for the particular values determinant of that distinction (Calavita, Garzón, and Cachón 2006, 191). In this paper, I adopt both the general disposition of the discursive school and that of its critics. Studies like Herzog et al.'s that employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) adopt, on one level, a post-structural conception of discourse as any social practice that communicates meaning from one actor to another. However, the claim that simply identifying prejudices in nativist discourses reveals racism implicitly assumes a Foucauldian-Derridean logic of discourse, in supposing that language is "constitutive of consciousness from the outset," and that discursive prejudices are "real-world" forms of discrimination (Derrida 1973, 6-7; Howells 1998, 43-44; Foucault 2002). The value-added of this logic of discourse lies

in its analysis of discursive structures. I do not deny the bitter cruelty of discursive prejudices; however, I assume that the discursive representation of the world does not necessarily fully reflect life or the state of the world's affairs. Whereas a Foucauldian-Derridean logic assumes that humans are subjectified by myriad discursive structures, I assume that all discursive actors have agency, and are "(re)produc[e] shared meanings, related interests, [potentially] aiming to impose them on others" (Leipold and Winkel 2013, 7). Hence, making claims about a way of life that rely exclusively on others' claims about that way of life for evidentiary support reflects a certain tautological reasoning, lending itself more than anything to confirmation bias and conceptual obscurity. I concede that discourse consists of any social practice that communicates meaning from one actor to another, but I deny that language constitutes actors' relations from the outset, or as Alexander Wendt puts it, that the world is made up of "discourses all the way down" (Wendt 1999, 110). By maintaining the distinction between language and an independent, physical reality, this paper's logic of discourse raises the threshold level of evidentiary support for oppression claims. In order to demonstrate that discrimination exists as a structural or systemic societal problem, it is not sufficient to show that *prejudices* exist. Rather, one must explain how those prejudices translate into negative consequences for oppressed persons and communities, however the latter may be defined. Here, I focus only on media discourses in a similar style as Herzog et al., but I refrain from claiming that this paper reveals any racism or oppression in practice—only in discourse. This study therefore adopts the discursive school of thought's methodological premises, but seeks to improve its conceptual assumptions.

This paper deals heavily with culture, its construction, and intercultural relations. Therefore, referring to culture necessitates some definition. Most basically, culture is the "way of life of a group of people—the behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols that they accept, generally without thinking about them" (Hall 1976, 17; Weaver 2013). Practically, discursive identity construction involves establishing cultural inand out-groups by fixing the identities of members of each group to various nodal meanings. These identities are layered and may have multiple meanings constructed by various, different discourses. Figure 1 demonstrates the theoretical identity construction of Signifier A by two different discourses 1 and N. Othering represents a specific kind of identity construction, whereby a cultural in-group—when presented with a new set of behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols—establishes a self-other dichotomy in order to legitimize their own set of behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols. For example, a report by the Open Society Foundations found that one principal source of immigrant marginalization in Manchester, England was the "strong sense of community" that simultaneously engendered "supportive conditions" for insiders, while also worsening integration conditions for "people perceived as 'outsiders'" (Open Society Foundations 2014, 11). Social identities consisting of the self and the other are relational—there is no clear "self" without an "other," since groups "define themselves in relation to others" (Okolie, 2). In terms of discourse analysis, othering entails the use of language and symbols to construct the identities of members of a cultural out-group as an intrinsically different other when compared to the cultural self

(Hülsse 2006; For another example of identity construction in Europe, see Said 1978). The relationship between self and other is also one of "power, of domination, [and] of varying degrees of a complex hegemony" (Said 1978, 5). However, at the same time as the dominant in-group constructs the out-group in one way, so too does the out-group imbue their own cultural practices with different meanings, constituting itself as its own in-group. In short, members of both in-and out-groups retain discursive agency and the ability "to get their message across by producing, distributing, and interpreting text" (Leipold and Winkel 2013, 5, 2016). Figure 2 demonstrates the hypothetical othering of population B by population A in country X. Moreover, the production, reproduction, and outcomes of discursive identity construction stem from—and oftentimes reinforce—historical structures, institutions, and social norms. As meanings that characterize discursive agents' linguistic and social practices become normalized over time by historical narratives, institutionalized in formal rules, and internalized in ordinary social norms and relations, those meanings then lead to one or another production of identity. For example, Sarah Léonard argues that securitizing discourses and practices in the European Union—institutionalized in Frontex—created an internal logic that lead to the presentation of migration and migrants as a security threat, resulting in "a negative impact on the status of asylum-seekers and migrants, including the protection of their human rights" (Léonard 2011, 2). In other words, the discursive production and reproduction (securitization) of migrants' identities' resulted in tangible outcomes (negative impact on human rights) and reinforced institutional norms (aversion to migrants and denial of asylum). Recall, however, that while these types of macro social structures are important for discursive identity construction, all discursive actors retain some modicum of autonomy. Individuals are not simply defined by discursive structures, but rather input their own meanings to construct their identities as well. Figure 3 outlines the layered process of identity (re)production and outcome in relation to historical structures, institutions, and social norms, using the hypothetical immigrant example. Importantly, this implies that measuring any given discourse's power grows with its production and reproduction, meaning that at least one element of a discourse's power entails is quantitative in nature. Thus, this paper's theoretical framework adopts two key assumptions, the first from discursive institutionalism, and the second from critical discourse theory. First, discourse—and the relations within any given discourse—deal "not only [with] the communication of ideas or 'text' but also [with] the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated" (Schmidt 2010, 4). In other words, this paper theoretically assumes that identities are produced and reproduced through and under the auspices of collective sets of institutions. Therefore, institutions are both "constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning," and are neither fixed nor given once created, but are rather always changing with the influx of new norms and ideas (Ibid; Schmidt 2008, 314). Second, although institutions may enable meaning-making processes, agency resides within subjects as well, not just the institutions they construct. Rather than a unidirectional top-down model of discourse whereby identities and meanings are constructed via discursive institutions

created by an assumedly exogenous force, discourse inherently implies a series of "dialectical relations between discourse and power" (Fairclough 2010, 8). Therefore, as individuals fill institutions with meaning (constructing political issues and identities one way or another), they create power imbalances, causing other individuals to resist the constructed the meanings in question. Essentially, discursive identity construction consists of a give-and-take relationship between individuals, who retain discursive agency, and institutions, through which meanings are produced and reproduced, leading to inequality and power struggles within any given discourse. This study is an interpretive CDA insofar as it deals with the power relations between different discursive actors' representations of Latin American immigrants' identities (Fairclough 2001, 232). While sympathetic to postmodern conceptualizations of discourse that do not rely on spoken or written language, this paper only includes written language in its dataset. This methodological choice does not exclude the possible existence of other forms of linguistic identity construction. It does, however, consider those forms extraneous to this study's data and purpose. Furthermore, this study is a CDA insofar as it "brings a normative element into [its] analysis" (Fairclough 2010, 6). Social science research assumes an implicit normative focus; we would not research discrimination if we did not perceive such research as somehow beneficial to society. In interpretive social scientific research, the principle of contextuality dictates that the meanings produced and reproduced by different actors in any discursive regime do not, and likely cannot, exist except in that specific context (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 49; Fairclough 2001). In other words, the specific time, place, political moment, and so on serve as enabling conditions for people's meaning-making processes. The central concept considered in this study is "Latin American," or rather, what it means to be Latin American within the current U.S. political climate. This study also considers the role of othering discourses in constructing Latin American identities from a U.S. print media perspective. One previous discourse analysis of Spanish print media highlights othering of Latin Americans in a 2000 article in *La Vanguardia*, which states: "Pickpockets and thieves comb Barcelona looking for tourists. Latin Americans are the best prepared pickpockets and North Africans dominate the art of robbing cars with their owner inside" (van Dijk 2004, 22). Linking Latin Americans to illicit or illegal activity implies their illegitimate place in Spanish society. In other words, oppressive and othering discourses imply that Latin American immigrants do not belong in Spain because they behave illegally upon arrival, even if they immigrated legally. Similarly, in the United States, Donald Trump disparaged Latin American—specifically Mexican—immigrants in announcing his bid for the 2016 U.S. presidential election, stating, "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. […] They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people" (TIME Staff 2015). Although no significant work on U.S. print media has been conducted so far, Spanish print media sources have cast Latin American immigrants' identities negatively, and primarily in terms of the law. Interpretive social scientific research further assumes the principle of reflexivity. Reflexivity refers to the notion that

"separation [of the researcher from the data] is impossible," and "considers the implications of the identity of the researcher for data collection and analysis" (Taylor 2001, 16). To that end, I am not Latin American, nor do I experience life day-to-day as an immigrant, and can therefore only make knowledge claims with the explicit recognition that my interpretation of U.S. media portrayals of Latin Americans invariably differs from interpretations of Latin Americans themselves, as well as the interpretations of any other ethnic or social group for that matter. The principle of reflexivity renders hypothesis testing impracticable and ineffective for making knowledge claims, according to the interpretivist tradition; therefore, in this paper, I refrain from hypothesizing about why U.S. media portrayals of Latin American immigrants exist the way they do, and instead seek to explain how media sources construct Latin American immigrants' identities. In order to understand media representations of Latin American immigrants, I used the LexisNexis database to collect all news articles related to Latin American immigration between 2015 and 2016 from the seven most widely circulated newspapers in the United States. These included *USA Today*, the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *Daily News*, the *New York Post*, and the *Washington Post*. In addition to their mass circulation, these papers demonstrate significant influence on political discourse and variation in political standpoint. As some scholars note, for example, the *New York Times* is the U.S.'s "'paper of record' and the *Washington Post* is often considered the official newspaper of Washington, DC" (Bachman 2015, 2). In order to ensure sufficient textual exposure, I sought to limit the articles collected to those explicitly related to Latin American immigration. To achieve this, I limited textual samples to those news articles with one or more references to a Latin American ethnicities and nationalities in their headlines, and migration in the body.[1] The search terms were based on Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they constitute this study's 23 "empty signifiers."[2] I then used QSR NVivo 11 to code all references to Latin American immigrants based on six popular media conceptualizations of Latin American immigrants.[3] I ran several tests on the data to determine word associations and frequency. First, I coded all references to Latin American immigrants defined by the first bulleted list given in Appendix A, including stemmed words such as—for example—Paraguay and Paraguayans with Paraguayan. Second, I coded for the following three positive and negative societal criteria (including their synonyms and stemmed words, such as ambition and hard working with hard work): Negative

- o Drugs (Node 1)
- o Theft (Node 2)
- o Assault (Node 3)

- Positive
  - o Education (Node 4)
  - o Success (Node 5)

- o   Hard work (Node 6)

Third, I ran a compound search that cross-referenced both sets of terms to determine how many times each media source referred to Latin American immigrants in relation to those criteria within the same context. This, however, presents an imprecise test if the goal is to determine each media source's understanding and portrayal of Latin American immigrants; for example, this test would count the two following hypothetical phrases within the same result.

- All Latin American immigrants are drug-dealers.
- Not all Latin American immigrants are drug-dealers.

Therefore, my fourth test consisted of coding each cross-referenced result based on its positive or negative association of each empty signifier to each node. In analyzing the data, I quantified the total number of coded references and mapped the power relations between the two hypothetical representations of Latin American immigrants in each source. The sample included 531 news articles—as Table 1 shows—with a total of 8355 references to empty signifiers 1-23 and 3276 references to nodes 1-6 (shown in Tables 2 and 3). In general, dominant U.S. media representations of Latin Americans displayed more positivity in relation to hard work, drugs, and education than their negative counterparts. In other words, these representations generally suggested that, ceteris paribus, Latin Americans do work hard, do not use drugs, and are well-educated. Overall, positive associations with nodes 4-6 and negative associations with nodes 1-3 comprise over 75% percent of the total discourse. This descriptive portrait contrasts prevailing U.S. public opinion, where only 45% of people believe that immigrants better American society, and where 50% believe that immigrants worsen American society in terms of crime and the economy (Pew Research Center 2015) To the extent, however, that this study concerns how the media represents the U.S. Latin American population—not whether one element of that diaspora is more or less represented than another—we can use a word association test to determine which ideas, concepts, or social practices are generally associated with media portrayals of different elements of Latin Americans in the U.S. Figure 5 demonstrates that the dominant association is with hard work. Indeed, associations between Latin Americans and hard work represent the majority of nodal associations (>50%) in all but one category of empty signifiers: Salvadorans (28.6%). Indexing these six nodes by their average percent share of associations with empty signifiers 1-23, finds the following:

1.  Hard work (54.97%)
2.  Assault (8.49%)
3.  Drugs                                                                                                          (8.44%)
    — discourses

4. Education (7.05%)
5. Success (3.53%)
6. Theft (0.14%)

Therefore, judging by an initial word association test, the dominant portrayal of Latin Americans by U.S. print media is in terms of hard work, assault, and drugs, despite the enormous gap between the first and second associations. Education, success, and theft represent less dominant representations, as measured by the frequency of associations between empty signifiers 1-23 and nodes 1-6. However, as discussed earlier, this initial test is somewhat inaccurate as it cannot distinguish between positive and negative associations within those categories. Figure 6 therefore disaggregates these data accordingly. Indexing these modified categories yields the following:

1. Hard work positive (51.82%)
2. Hard work negative (42.1%)
3. Assault                                      negative                                      (11.9%)
   —
4. Drugs positive (9.67%)
5. Education positive (7.27%)
6. Education                                      negative                                      (6.44%)
   —
7. Assault positive (5.07%)
8. Success negative (4.57%)
9. Success positive (4.39%)
10. Theft negative (0.53%)
11. Drugs negative (4.03%)
12. Theft positive (0.03%)

Crucially, here, "positive" and "negative" refers to the explicit or implicit value given to word associations. Essentially, a positive representation of Latin Americans in terms of drugs might imply that most Latin Americans do not consume, produce, sell, distribute, etc. drugs. In the first index, two-thirds of the dominant media portrayals of the U.S. Latin American diaspora held socially negative connotations. (In other words, if we accept the top half of the index as the dominant media portrayal of Latin Americans, then the first word association test results in two negatively connoted categories out of three total categories: assault and drugs.) In the second index, though, negatively connoted associations comprised only one-half of the dominant media portrayals. Furthermore, even if we accept just the top three categories as the dominant media portrayals, only one-third of those categories hold socially

negative connotations in the second index. Excluding results that returned a value of "0" for any given crossreference, Table 4 below provides a breakdown of the largest and smallest percent share of each nodal association within each empty signifier. The dominant discourse (as measured by a descriptive statistical portrait) of U.S. print media's representations thus primarily associates Latin Americans positively with hard work (which claims the highest percent share in 12 out of 19 nodes). Before moving on to the next section, it is important to discuss the relative representation of some Latin American identities compared to others. That the sampling returned no results from the first (*Wall Street Journal*) and fourth (*Los Angeles Times*) most widely circulated newspapers in the U.S. seems problematic from the outset. This indicates either (1) a measurement error within this study, or (2) a distorted discursive reality that does not match the "real-world" U.S. ethnic composition. Yet even within the news sources for which the sampling did return results, representational errors occur. For example, Venezuelans were covered 72 times (approximately 1.9% of the total references to a specific group when excluding non-specific signifiers such as Hispanic, Latin American, Latino, and Immigrant). At the same time, however, Venezuelans only comprise around 0.5% of the total U.S. Hispanic population according to a 2015 Pew Research Center report (López 2015, 1). Compare this to, for example, Mexicans who were covered 901 (23.5%) times, yet comprised approximately 63% of the U.S. Hispanic population in 2010 (Lopez and Dockterman 2011, 1). Some signifiers essentially received disproportionately more or less media representation than others when compared to their relative makeup of the Hispanic population in the U.S.

**Текст 11.** Populist Mobocracy, Fear, and Lies: The Politics of American Populism

http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1756/populist-mobocracy-fear-and-lies-

American policy today operates in an arena where truth and objective reality are bent to the designs of particular interests, powerful people and commercial profiteers. All *facts* are questioned; the *truth* has *purposes*. Populist and nationalist waves are pulsing through many western democratic republics in the West; these waves are a challenge to the values of liberal democracy. A *populist* believes that the common man is possessed of the highest virtues and an earthy, superior wisdom. Fareed Zakaria said in *Foreign Affairs* (2017) that, "populism sees itself as speaking for the forgotten 'ordinary' person and often imagines itself as the voice of genuine patriotism." Geert Wilders (Netherlands), Norbert Hofer (Austria), Marine LePen (France), Nigel Farage (UK), Matteo Salvini (Italy), all shared with Donald Trump a gift for appealing to the common citizen motif while appropriating national identity. Each strums populist chords just barely outside the framework of neo-Fascism. The threat to democracy is palpable as citizens demand quick answers to complicated and long term social and economic problems. Populism has two faces. On the one side, populism can be a builder of positive change and expanded human rights, (e.g. Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King), or on the other side, a flaming brand of fire that

incinerates liberty, burns down community and condemns common decency to ashes (e.g. Hitler, Mussolini, or the Ku Klux Klan). Populism is not the same as social justice, and although often twisted to appear to represent the common people, is just as often a distraction away from what is really the exploitation, confusion, even oppression of the common average everyday folks. The expansion of rights and liberties for any one group is almost never done at the expense of other groups, especially elites. Many have said for example that any effort to regulate guns more strenuously, or to deny access to something like Assault style weapons, is a subtraction of the rights of those people, supported by the Second Amendment of the US constitution, to own, possess and bear arms. This is of course, a vast misreading of the Second Amendment because we all know that military grade weapons, and modern assault rifles were never in the minds of the Framers. More to the point, no one actually has an unfettered right to guns. What does it mean to "bear arms?" What is the definition of "arms" in all cases? As long as the right of the Second Amendment is sustained, no one would lose a right. Having said that, nothing is more final than death. To keep people safe from gun violence, it is impossible really to regulate anything but the guns—in the same ways that Americans employed common sense to regulate alcohol, driving, automobile manufacturing, smoking and tobacco use, and many other things. The greater right is the right to be healthy and safe; the greater right for example, is to be free from gun violence. Populism and guns do not belong in the same house. According to Jan-Werner Muller, in his book: *What is Populism?* (2016): *"The danger to democracies today is not some comprehensive ideology that systematically denies democratic ideals. The danger is populism—a degraded form of democracy that promises to make good on democracy's highest ideals," (p. 6).* Muller goes on to theorize: *"Populism…is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified—but …ultimately fictional—people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior…..This is the core claim of populism: only some of the people are really the people," (pp. 19-21).* And---Plato in *The Republic* was also discouraged by popular politics. Plato argued extensively, but especially in Book VIII of *The Republic*, that too much democracy will tempt the citizens to surge toward one man as their leader. The demagogue promises *liberty* as *the* goal for the average person. The "liberated" masses may then take the property of the wealthy for themselves while the elites and those with wealth become "enemies of the people." Arrested as criminals, targeted "elites" suffer exile or execution (as was Socrates), by a mindless, passionate crowd. Plato warned that those who know least how to govern may take control of the polis, and in a paroxysm of hate and selfishness, they grasp what it is they want and destroy decency, dialogue and a pursuit of the good (Plato, 1985). Plato wrote: *"So it goes with democracy's permissiveness. It exhibits a fine lack of concern for all the requirements we so painstakingly set forth when founding our city. It scorns our judgment that in the absence of transcendent gifts no man can become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his activities are guided by what is fair and good. All these things are trampled underfoot; the democratic*

*city cares nothing for the past behavior of the man who enters public life. He need only proclaim himself a friend of the people and he will be honored,"* (Plato, 1985, p. 249). Plato's wild proposal of the "Philosopher King," is grounded on the premise that you should not leave the governance of the polis in the hands of a demagogue or ruthless politician whose only virtue is pandering to citizens to do their worst. Unlike Plato, I argue that Baldwin was a philosopher for the oppressed, the broken, and the common people in his way. Even so, James Baldwin called out not in a populist voice, but to a higher moral claim. James Baldwin's voice confronted common ignorance, called it out for what it truly was, and unafraid of exposure as a philosopher, scholar, critic, Black man, civil rights leader and a homosexual. James Baldwin did not compromise. Political movements that allow followers to compromise their moral values should always be suspect in our eyes and they are easily converted from *populism to mobocracy: government by the mob.* One of the key characteristics that distinguish one kind of populism over another is the manner in which fear may be deployed in rhetoric and propaganda, as well as the ideology of the putative or nascent movement. The great illusion is hidden in the belief that in acting as the mob, the *common people* are engaged in *democratic action*. This is when a *fear born* movement displays a threat to freedom. Resenting, hating, excluding and asserting your rights against "The Other" derives from a primordial passion in humanity called fear. It is not democratic. The element of fear in the rhetoric of populist movements inspires fanatic delusions. Where fear is present, we will also find ignorance, anger, hatred and violence. The only opposition to fear in politics is hope and confidence, and a belief in the democratic ideal: that people, under the proper circumstances are capable of leading self-determined lives. It is a lucky thing that it is possible for the democratic idea to predominate over fear. Even so, fear is a natural part of the human condition. The flight and startle mechanisms natural to human beings played a significant role in the evolutionary ability to survive. Fear generates a condition of heightened attentiveness and operates as a warning to be cautious and gives human beings suddenly quick perceptions. In these moments of *quick perception,* we are also most vulnerable to deception and error. We make false judgments and calculations. Seeing is not always believing, but believing, unfortunately, is often seeing. In 1948 Hannah Arendt explained the connection between mobs, thoughtlessness and identity in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1948) where she detailed the thoughtless desire to find meaning and value in life by becoming part of the mass movement. The illusion of meaning to the lost believers is so strong they will sacrifice themselves for the movement, even to the point of persecuting themselves. Hannah Arendt explained in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1948): *"The attraction of evil and crime for the mob mentality is nothing new. It has always been true that the mob will greet 'deeds of violence with the admiring remark: it may be mean but it is very clever.' The disturbing factor in the success of totalitarianism is rather the true selflessness of its adherents: it may be understandable that a Nazi or Bolshevik will not be shaken in his conviction by crimes against people who do not belong to the movement or are even hostile to it; but the amazing fact is*

*that neither is he likely to waver when the monster begins to devour its own children….and sent to a forced-labor or concentration camp. On the contrary, to the wonder of the whole civilized world, he (the follower in the movement) may even be willing to help in his own prosecution and frame his own death sentence if only his status as a member of the movement is not touched,"* (Arendt, p. 409-410). So, imagine someone who believes in the movement so much they are willing of course to accept persecution—even at the hands of their own leadership? Therefore, we should not wonder why a follower of a fear driven popular movement is willing to believe lies, to keep following a demagogue no matter what he or she sees and hears, and to wrap themselves in an echo chamber where they only hear the voices of those who make them comfortable. Fear and ignorance bring people together for mutual support, and combine in generating a mob—and mobs become politically very potent if their perceptions have been properly manipulated. In 1951, Eric Hoffer argued in his classic book *The True Believer* that in the mob, or the mass, human decency is lost as the individual casts judgment and doubt aside for the group mind. Eric Hoffer wrote in *The True Believer* that: *"There is no telling to what extremes of cruelty and ruthlessness a man will go when he is freed from the fears, hesitations and doubts and the vague stirrings of decency that go with individual judgment,"* (Hoffer, p. 93). Fears, prejudices and anxieties of followers develop effective anchors, and create the conditions for a popular movement to flourish and in these cases the frightened and lonely find one another in what they believe is a common cause. Human beings have to make decisions in an environment for which their evolutionary natures are poorly prepared. Recognition of the power of fear shaping rhetoric can be traced to the 4th century BCE and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Aristotle explained in *The Rhetoric* the value and the dangers of fear as a method to persuade an audience. In his research Aristotle compared fear to a kind of pain that predicts, or portends to the target audience the coming of a future harm or evil. Aristotle was convinced that people do not generally fear that they are unjust within themselves. Instead, we tend to believe we are in control of our own moral character. We fear other people because we believe or perceive them to have the power to harm us; and we imagine that *the Other* is motivated by the worst intentions. As people we tend to see ourselves as acting justice, and the Other is the one who is being unjust, or who threatens us. When we perceive another person or group as willing and able to hurt us, we are easily carried away by our imaginations. Fear and the *Common Good*

Aristotle sincerely argued in the best circumstances of political and social life people should be able to think and act reflectively. To make ethical political choices people need to have an adequate conception of their welfare and the common good, and he was concerned that people tend to place too much value on the passions and the appetites: money, pleasure, consumption and personal honor or gratification. Only by persuasion and education are people shown that friendship, civic engagement, and actively seeking the common good—in other words truly virtuous actions—only these things bring real meaning and value to human lives and are superior to the appetites of money, pleasure and honor. Even so, none of this means

anything if people cannot think for themselves, and this requires certain psychological conditions. If human beings are thoughtless and ignorant then their freedom is more a curse than a virtue. Political understanding and the kind of nuanced reasoning necessary to control fear and other less well guarded passions is not easy (and may help explain anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, racial, ethnic and gender fears today in America). Such understanding requires cultivation, education and nourishment. Fear generates error and falsehood. Fear tempts people to misread what truly threatens them. For example, fear persuades people to believe that immigration bans, the possession of automatic weapons, harsh criminal punishments, or the use of capital punishment can make society safer. It is nearly impossible to convince fearful people that these policies are not only wasteful, but the evidence shows they do not make society safer. Hatred and fear often inspire feelings of disgust. How often have nations falsely called some group or nation a threat, and then converted the perceived enemies into disgusting and contemptuous forms of animal life? Whenever we hear our leaders refer to other people or groups as "our enemies," or with slurs, or as criminals, we should be wary indeed. Fear in Sam Adams, Adolf Hitler and Donald Trump?

Most Americans view Sam Adams as a Revolutionary Hero and founder of the Sons of Liberty, but Adams used fear in his rhetoric and propaganda. The most obvious case was Adam's manipulation of the Boston Massacre, where he exaggerated the criminal violence of the British soldiers to agitate colonial anti-British sentiment. The Boston Massacre became a part of the American Revolutionary myth. Adams deceived his target audience, and correctly saw fear as the way to shake off the indifference of many Americans. He instigated a form of domestic terror campaign by the Sons of Liberty. Organized to spread the word of rebellion, the Sons of Liberty also used violent means on occasion to shut down a newspaper or editor who was loyal to the British Crown. The genius of Adams' efforts can best be found in his creation of the "Committees of Correspondence." These committees were able to spread effective fear-filled propaganda up and down the colonies through letter writing. This was the 18th Century version of the social network—slower but just as effective, (Thum and Thum, 2006). By comparison to a character like Sam Adams, history views Adolf Hitler as a malignant monster. Even so, like Sam Adams, Hitler's primary propaganda tool was fear. To be clear, no one should equate Sam Adams (or Donald Trump for that matter) with Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. All the same, the use of common strategies of fear show the effectiveness and dangers in their use. Hitler used a number of specialized *Projection Devices* where fear was employed such as his claim that the cure for Germany's problems could be found in scapegoats. Germany's *political and social diseases* were blamed on scapegoats such as Jews, Gypsies, Liberal Politicians, Socialists, the Versailles Treaty, and so on. Fear allowed for possible purification by disassociation as the "Others" became the enemy. Using a similar technique, the National Populism of President Trump (in many ways given great inspiration and development by the excommunicated adviser Steve Bannon and *Breitbart*), also employs fear through scapegoats. To encourage fear and anger Donald Trump highlighted an array of American scapegoats who are part of a dark tableau of society. The Trump

scapegoats include: the Press media, Muslims, Immigrants and Refugees, Mexicans, Liberals, Socialists, and Atheists. President Trump repeatedly proclaims (especially on Twitter) that these folks (scapegoats) such as the "dishonest press" are at the root of the "America carnage." Hitler effectively employed fear in another unification device that exploited a perverse sense of German dignity. According to the Nazis, a special kind of dignity was available to all German people if they were to acquire it by living and thinking the right way. Hitler's twist was that the Nazis equated right living and ideas with the Aryan superman: race, blood and soil, in the German Nation (Burke, 2006). This technique is a common ploy of national populist movements. For example, in Donald Trump's appeals (invented by Steve Bannon) three principles are central: 1) Unfettered [capitalism](); 2) Judeo-Christian values; and 3) patriotic [nationalism](). As President Trump proclaimed, there are no divisions in America as long as Americans accept one patriotism and one nationalism. In his 2017 *Inaugural Address,* Trump put it this way: *"At the bedrock of our politics will be a total allegiance to the United States of America, and through our loyalty to our country, we will discover our loyalty to each other."* And President Trump later added: *"When it is time to remember that old wisdom our soldiers will never forget: that whether we are black, or brown, or white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots, we all enjoy the same glorious freedoms, and we all salute the same great American Flag, you open your heart to patriotism, there is no room for prejudice."* Trump's populist nationalism rejects differentiation along color, religious, ethnic or gender lines. No one is allowed to be a victim. With "right thinking"—especially the right kind of Judeo-Christian thinking—all may be included as part of the nation. The technique creates an artificial separation between "real Americans" and (in the original form of the Bannon/Trump world view), and all the rest who will be excluded if unwilling to join. People who do not agree with these shared values are not welcome in America and the Trump device exploits fear and opposition to immigrants-- and especially Muslims, or illegal immigrants from Mexico—a land of "Bad Hombres," drug dealers and rapists. President Trump is not Adolf Hitler, but he clearly employs scapegoats, resentment and exclusion, as propellants for a fear centered propaganda machine. One of the chief threats to democracy and the American Republic may lie in the corroding of the inner dispositions to democracy and civic life. The challenge to forming that more perfect Union, as Lincoln (1861) described in his first *Inaugural Address,* is battling the rhetoric of fear, and the mendacity that accompanies it in politics. Fear in political rhetoric is poison in the democratic well. Fear brings out our worst beliefs and most ignorant ideas. The antidote to the poison of fear is reason, common sense, healthy skepticism, informed dialogue and common decency. James Madison said in *Federalist* No. 55: *"As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form,"* (Madison, Federalist No. 55). Madison was unaware of human psychology but he possessed an astute awareness of human frailty. Checking the ambitions of "men" was the most

plausible method of government operating with his world view, and this meant channeling the ambitions of the popular citizenry, and also the political leaders and institutions. Madison believed that human beings, given time, opportunity and intelligence, would eventually control fear, violence and hatred with rule of law and the proper institutions. Self-government is never perfect, but for Madison it is a theoretical calculation that "presupposes the higher qualities of human nature." That bet—or gamble—lies at the core of the democratic ideal or democratic possibility. Fear, especially nationalistic fear, is therefore very dangerous to democracy. Populism is perhaps always a degraded kind of democracy, but populism itself is not the main danger so much as it is *the type of populism*. Liberal democracy is possessed of certain values; values intimated in Madison's political theory, and among these in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is pluralism. For liberal values to flourish, a certain amount of reflective thinking, as well as caution, is required. The Madisonian system relies on enough of that reasonable and informed guidance to survive in an unpredictable world. Fear and Nationalism

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution understood that the American Republic was not, and could not be, perfect at the beginning. What Americans inherited from their revolution is an uncharted path to the future. Given qualified tools of self-determination, liberty and rights to make the journey, Americans will decide how they wish to define the role of government in their lives. To make a more perfect union will likely mean separating American skepticism toward government intellectually from the ideals of democratic governance which must accept rule of law, compromise and common sense. The problem of nationalist populism founded on fear is that the most vital of the democratic instincts are extinguished by a narrow world view that separates all Americans from "real Americans." This was (and remains) the danger in France in 2017 as the National Front Party surged forward in French national elections. The national Front was defeated, but the question remains: for how long? The Brexit vote also indicated that many in Britain had succumbed to fears of European integration and what this could mean for the British identity. Italian elections in 2018 showed everyone that the populist-nationalist fever of fragmentation and anger is not yet broken in the West. Of course there are legitimate economic and social criticisms that the European Union must address, but what about the deeper values and principles the EU stands for: Human Rights, Western democracy, Constitutionalism, environmental sustainability, and global fairness. In the end, the rejection of a future of multilateral responsibility may lead the world to discard fairness and rule of law. The push back against democracy is about economic goods and services, but even more about values and identities. This is where America finds itself in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, with a demagogic leader at the front of a populist movement. The most dangerous aspect is not that Trump is a populist. The dangers are in the anti-democratic values he espouses, the corruption he may encourage, and the crushing humiliation of the rule of law at both the domestic and international levels (Bazelon, 2017). The claim that the people have willed it all to be so is the very thing Madison feared. Madison believed the Republic could control for the rise of such factions. There was no way to know that the system that controls and

balances minorities and their passions would one day see the rise of a populist and right-wing nationalist movement inspired by fear and frustration. Even so, there is hope that the tools of checking the rise of factions and holding back the potential distemper of popular movements and demagogues will aid in moving the Republic toward that "more perfect Union." In 1962, James Baldwin said in the essay *Down at the Cross*: *The price of the liberation of white people is the liberation of the blacks—the total liberation, in the cities, in the towns, before the law and in the mind, (Baldwin, p. 97)* Are Americans prepared in 2018 for a philosophical battle in defense of democratic values? National Populism has not emerged by accident, or like frogs sprouting out of the mud. In fact, nationalism and fear are on the rise also because of the selfish acts and intentions of the wealthiest elite classes, throughout the West, who attempted at the close of the 20$^{th}$ century to snatch back the successful spread of wealth, resources and rights among middle and working classes since the Second World War. The increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer people is one good reason that conservative Western and American elites rebel at the terminology of "class warfare" and racism in politics. Somehow though, the onrushing political result of a surging right-wing identity politics may have many folks wishing for a return to the old rhetoric of "class warfare."

Контролируемые компетенции: ОК-8,- 9; ОПК-7, -31; ПК-16, -17, -18, -28, -29, -30

Оценка компетенций осуществляется в соответствии с Таблицей 4.

**Вопросы зачета с оценкой (4 семестр)**

1. Расскажите о результатах вашего исследования в форме ВКР.

2. Как вы оцениваете степень изученности исследуемой проблемы в научной литературе и статьях?

3. Каково, по вашему мнению, содержание теоретически и практически нерешенных и дискуссионных проблем в сфере вашего исследования?

4. Как вы оцениваете степень теоретической изученности исследуемой проблемы?

5. Чем характеризуется общее состояние объекта и предмета исследования?

6. Какие новые умения вы получили после работы над этим проектом?

7. Назовите основные причины выбора использованных научных источников.

8. Какие задачи вы решили в научном исследовании?

9. Назовите основные положения выводов вашего научного исследования.

10. Какие статьи по теме выпускной квалификационной работы опубликованы?

11. Опишите кратко основное содержание опубликованных статей по теме исследования.

12. В работе каких научно-практических конференций вы приняли участие?

13. Какие основные проблемы по теме научного исследования вы можете выделить?

**Критерии выставления зачета с оценкой**

Оценка **«Отлично»** ставится в случае, когда магистрант предоставляет полный, развернутый письменный отчет о результатах НИР за семестр, в ходе устной защиты промежуточных результатов научного исследования грамотно и аргументировано формулирует значимость проделанной работы, демонстрирует отличное знание библиографии по исследуемому вопросу, методологических подходов и принципов научного исследования, понимание специфики научных текстов.

Оценка **«Хорошо»** ставится в случае, когда магистрант предоставляет полный, развернутый письменный отчет о результатах НИР за семестр, в ходе устной защиты промежуточных результатов научного исследования достаточно грамотно формулирует значимость проделанной работы, демонстрирует хорошее знание библиографии по исследуемому вопросу, методологических подходов и принципов научного исследования, понимание специфики научных текстов.

Оценка **«Удовлетворительно»** ставится в случае, когда магистрант предоставляет достаточно полный письменный отчет о результатах НИР за семестр, в ходе устной защиты промежуточных результатов научного исследования формулирует значимость проделанной работы, демонстрирует знание библиографии по исследуемому вопросу, но иногда затрудняется дать необходимые пояснения, демонстрирует знание методологических подходов и принципов научного исследования, допуская при этом незначительные ошибки, понимание специфики научных текстов.

Оценка **«Неудовлетворительно»** ставится в случае, когда магистрант предоставляет неполный письменный отчет о результатах НИР за семестр, в ходе устной защиты промежуточных результатов научного исследования с трудом формулирует значимость проделанной работы, демонстрирует плохое знание библиографии по исследуемому вопросу, затрудняется дать необходимые пояснения, демонстрирует незнание методологических подходов и принципов научного исследования, допускает существенные ошибки в понимании специфики научных текстов.

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(подпись)

«___» _____20__г.


Утверждено на заседании кафедры романо-германских языков от «    »_____20    г.
Протокол № ___


Зав. кафедры романо-германских языков

С. Казиахмедова